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INTRODUCTION

The once dusty arena of international patent law now hosts a
life and death contest. Human rights activists claim patents restrict
access to essential technologies in the developing world and skew
research and development away from global health and welfare
problems.
Industrialized countries argue that innovation and
development require strong patent protection. Both sides agree that
much of the world lacks meaningful access to technologies that are
basic to a healthy standard of living.
Current international patent rules strike an uneasy balance
between these conflicting views about patents. The precarious nature
of this balancing act is illustrated by the recent heated debate about
compulsory licenses for certain "essential medicines" under the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") agreement.
Developing countries and activists argued that TRIPS should be
liberally interpreted to facilitate compulsory licenses for the
production and exportation of generic medicines by developing
countries. Developed countries argued that any exceptions to TRIPS
should be limited to a narrow list of diseases. The debate produced a
procedurally complex compromise that will do little to ameliorate the
essential medicines problem.
This Article argues that the recent debate was misplaced
because it ignored differing price elasticities of demand in developed
and developing country markets. In connection with price, demand
elasticity refers to the relationship between changes in demand and
changes in price. Demand is considered "elastic" if a change in price
produces a relatively large change in demand and "inelastic" if a
change in price has relatively little effect on demand.1 Demand
elasticity is a primary driver of the utility of patent rules. If demand
is inelastic, strong patent protection allows the patent owner to charge
1.

A more formal definition of demand elasticity is presented in Part IV., infra.
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a price premium, which minimalizes the social cost 2 of the patent
monopoly. If demand is elastic, however, the justification for strong
patent protection evaporates. 3 In a demand elastic market, the patent
4
owner cannot sustain supercompetitive pricing.
Demand elasticities differ significantly in developed and
developing country markets for many essential technologies. The
essential medicines problem is an excellent illustration of this point.
Demand for pharmaceutical products generally is inelastic in
developed countries when the condition the product treats is prevalent
in such countries. Treatments for HIV/AIDS, for example, can be
priced well above marginal cost in developed countries, because the
market for such drugs is relatively inelastic and the price increase will
not significantly affect demand.5 However, when the product treats
conditions endemic primarily to developing countries, such as malaria
or river blindness, demand generally is elastic in developed countries,
or the market in developed countries is so small that there effectively
is no demand. 6 In contrast, demand for pharmaceutical products is
nearly always elastic in developing countries, where only the wealthy
elite can afford brand name drugs, regardless of the condition the
7
product treats.
These differences in demand elasticity in developed and
developing country markets create two problems. First, treatments
that are priced at above-market levels are not available to most of the
affected population in developing countries. The social cost of the
patent monopoly, therefore, is measured in human lives. Second,
when demand is elastic or the market is very small in developed
countries, as it is for treatments for tropical diseases, a firm that is
focused on a "blockbuster" economic model, such as a multinational
pharmaceutical company,8 will not be spurred to innovate regardless
of the level of patent protection in any market.
We might reluctantly accept these costs if they were essential
to the development of at least one category of new drugs. At the very
least, a system of strong patent protection in both developed and
2.
As discussed in Part II.A., infra, the social cost of the patent monopoly includes the
reduction in output that results when prices are set above a competitive level.
3.
See infra Part IV.
4.
See infra Part IV.
5.
See infra Part III.C.
6.
See id.
7.
See id.
8.
Examples of "multinational pharmaceutical companies" include many members of the
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). For a list of members, see
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America, Who are We, Member Company List,
Member List, at http://www.phrma.org/whoweare/members (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
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developing countries might encourage the creation of some drugs that
benefit consumers in developed countries.
Eventually, cheaper
versions would become available in developing countries as patent
protection expires and generic competitors enter the market. This
would be preferable to the innovation vacuum that might exist
without patent protection. Treatments for conditions endemic to
developing countries could then be developed through a mixture of
public subsidies and private donations. This Article argues, however,
that the level of patent protection in developing countries is irrelevant
as an incentive for innovation when there is inelastic demand and a
relatively large market in developed countries.
The argument is supported with a game theory analysis of the
essential medicines debate. Basic game theory provides a simple yet
powerful model to illustrate how firms will respond to differing levels
of patent protection in developing countries.
The game theory
analysis set forth in Part VI of this Article shows that, at least with
respect to essential medicines for which there is strong demand in
developed countries, the international patent system governing such
products should allow greater flexibility for generic "imitator"
competition in developing country markets.
With respect to diseases endemic to developing countries, the
game theory analysis set forth in this Article shows that subsidies
may in fact help spur innovation.
However, a subsidy of any
reasonable size is unlikely to make a difference by itself. Instead, it
may be useful to focus the patent incentive scheme on firms that are
indigenous to the region in which the problem is endemic.
A principal means of building flexibility into a patent system is
to allow for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licenses, however, are
seldom intended to be costless. The licensee must typically provide
some remuneration to the unwilling licensor. This is the case, for
example, under the compulsory licensing provisions in TRIPS.9 Part
IV.B.3. describes a mechanism whereby the remuneration
requirement would serve as an incentive for firms in developing
countries to innovate with respect to local diseases. In return for a
lucrative compulsory license for essential medicines produced by
developed country firms, the developing country firm would agree to
conduct original research and development on medicines for local
diseases. The game theory analysis in Part VI.B.2.c. shows that this
option may provide a more efficient and socially desirable balance of
incentives.

9.

See infra Part II.D., for a discussion of compulsory licensing under TRIPS.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT STRUCTURE AND THE "ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES" DEBATE

A. Globalization of IPRs and the Advent of TRIPS
Intellectual Property Rights ("IPRs") are utilitarian tools
designed to encourage innovation and public disclosure. 10 Patents are
a type of IPR that provide this encouragement by granting certain
exclusive rights to an invention, with the resulting prospect of
monopoly rents." Monopoly rents imply a reduction in output. 12 The
value of this reduction in output is the "deadweight loss" of the
13
monopoly.
Patents, like other IPRs, are territorial.1 4
Societies that
provide patent protection accept the deadweight loss associated with
this incentive system as a necessary cost of the bargain struck with
the inventor. 15 Various nations balance these concerns differently,
and, therefore, the substantive scope and procedural availability of

10.

See KEITH E.

MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 28

(2000) (noting that "[m]ost legal systems adopt a utilitarianview, in which IPRs strike a balance
between needs for invention and creation, on the one hand, and needs for diffusion and access, on
the other"). As Maskus notes, however, there are some threads of natural rights theory in some
intellectual property rules, reflected perhaps most directly in the European concept of "moral
rights." Id. at 27-28; see also A. Samuel Oddi, The InternationalPatent System and Third World
Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 837-65 (1987) (discussing utilitarian
assumptions underlying patent systems in developed countries and the application of those
assumptions).
11. Whether the incentives provided by patent laws are truly meaningful in a broad sense is
a subject of intense debate. The classical view is that patent incentives are essential in researchintensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 43 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that without a patent system, inventive activity would be biased
in favor of inventions that could be kept secret); Statement by PhRMA President and CEO Alan
F. Holmer on the Importance of Intellectual Property for Patients Worldwide (Nov. 20, 2002)
("Intellectual property protections are the answer to new cures .... "), at http://www.
phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/20.11.2002.628.cfm. Other commentators believe the need
for patent incentives is overstated, particularly in developing countries. See Oddi, supra note 10,
at 846 (suggesting the rationale for a patent system may not be equally applicable to developing
countries, because of the significant social costs they may confer on those countries); MASKUS,
supra note 10, at 28-32 (discussing economics of intellectual property rights and circumstances
under which protections are good or bad); see also HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS 407-408 (1993) (discussing deadweight loss of monopoly).
12. VARIAN, supra note 11, at 407-410.
13. Id.
14. MASKUS, supra note 10, at 3.
15. Id. at 28-30; see also VARIAN, supra note 11, at 407-408 (discussing deadweight loss of
monopoly); Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and The Doha
"Solution",3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 48-49 (2003) (discussing the effect of deadweight loss resulting
from monopolies on pharmaceuticals in developing countries).
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intellectual property protections can vary significantly across
16
borders.
Although IPRs are territorial, the industries that rely on IPRs
are increasingly global. As Keith Maskus has suggested, these
multinational industries can be broadly divided into three IPR
"complexes": the Patent Complex, which includes pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, and plant varieties; the Copyright Complex, which
includes
recorded
entertainment,
software,
and
internet
transmissions; and the Trademark Complex, which includes status
goods. 17 The increasing importance of these multinational IPR
complexes has given rise to a more coherent system of international
IPR standards.
This set of international intellectual property standards is
located in a number of treaties and international agreements,
including the Berne Convention, 18 the Paris Convention, 19 and TRIPS
Agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). 20 TRIPS incorporates the Paris Convention and Berne
Convention and is the most comprehensive of all the international IPR
21
regimes in terms of scope and membership.
TRIPS has been described as a "constitution-like" agreement in
that it requires member nations to agree to certain overarching
principles and minimum standards. 22
Among these minimum
standards is a requirement that all member nations provide patent
protection for any product or process inventions in any field of

16. MASKUS, supra note 10, at 3.
17. Id. at 52-65.
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (covering copyrights).
19. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised
at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (covering patents, trademarks,
trade names, utility models, industrial designs and unfair competition).
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement]; Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33

I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. no. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
21. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WHO: The Organization, Members
and Observers (showing that there are currently 148 members to the WTO that are obligated to
follow TRIPS), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last updated
Oct. 13, 2004).
22. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 36
INTERECONOMICS 98 (2001) (stating "[tihe WTO is constitution-like in reaching into the nationstate to guarantees rights to individuals").
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technology that satisfy the conditions of novelty, 23 an inventive step, 24
25
and industrial applicability.
When national intellectual property laws are harmonized, as
they were under TRIPS, however, problems arise when some member
nations are better equipped than others to absorb the deadweight
losses resulting from IPRs. These differences are most pronounced
between the more developed "North" and the less developed "South."26
The North has been more willing to absorb the deadweight losses
associated with strong IPRs in order to encourage innovation and
protect existing industries. 27 The South has been less willing to do so
because "copycat" industries provide jobs and access to cheap goods so
that there is little need to invest in and bear the risks of original
28
research and development.
International IPR agreements typically include limited
exceptions designed to ease some of this tension. Under TRIPS, for
example, a member nation may require a compulsory license of an
article or process subject to an IPR in "the case of a national
23. See TRIPS art. 33(2); Paul J. Heald, Mowing The PlayingField: Addressing Information
Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MIN. L. R. 249, 275 n. 113 (2003) (describing
the TRIPS requirement of "absolute novelty" of the patent at the time of filing, in contrast to the
USPTO practice of allowing the patent to be on sale or known for less than one year (35 U.S.C.
§102 (b)); see also J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 30 (1997) (asserting that since the
original TRIPS agreement does not supply definitions to the terms, each of the member countries
relies on its own legal definition allowing member countries to choose to define "novelty" in a way
that will broaden their patent protection or, conversely, narrow it based on their particular
needs).
24. See TRIPS art. 33(3) (defining satisfaction of the inventive step requirement as an
invention that, in light of the prior art, known prior and up to, the time of filing, would not have
been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art).
The parallel requirement of
nonobviousness in the United States is codified at 35 U.S.C §103 (a). There is some debate,
however, about whether the U.S. standard is consistent with TRIPS. See, e.g., Reichman, supra
note 23, at 30 (noting that similar to the novelty requirement, no agreed-upon standard exists for
what is nonobvious, allowing each member country to make the definition most appropriate for
their needs).
25. See TRIPS art. 33(4) ("[A] claimed invention shall be considered industrially applicable
if, according to its nature, it can be made or used (in the technological sense) in any kind of
industry. 'Industry' shall be understood in its broadest sense, as in the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property.").
26. See e.g., Oddi, supra note 10, at 846 (noting that traditional rationales for having a
patent system may not hold true for developing countries); Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of
Informal Regulatory Cooperation in International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual
Property Regime, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 277, 286 (2001) (noting that, as discussions
concerning international intellectual property harmonization proceeded in the 1980s, "[d]iffering
levels of protection between industrialized and developing countries more often than not
reflected deep ideological divisions about the proper role of intellectual property rights in a
growing economy").
27. MASKUS, supra note 10, at 4.
28. Id.
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emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use." 29 Such compulsory licenses, however,
must be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use."30 The question of what constitutes a
"national emergency" and of how the "domestic market" provision
should apply underlies the current debate over whether TRIPS will
impair access to "essential medicines." The next Section describes the
"essential medicines" problem and how it is intertwined with the
international patent system.
B. The "EssentialMedicines"Access Problem
The World Health Organization ("WHO") defines "essential
medicines" as "those that satisfy the health care needs of the majority
of the population."3 1 The WHO maintains a Model List of Essential
Medicines that includes medicines for a wide variety of conditions
ranging from alimentary tract disorders (such as peptic ulcers) to
sensory organ problems (such as eye infections). 32 According to the
WHO, over one-third of the world's population (two billion people)
lacks access to many of these essential medicines. 3 3 The percentage
34
rises to over 50 percent in the poorest African and Asian countries.
Many factors affect access to essential medicines. These
include lack of health care provider education, poor distribution
networks, and poor patient compliance. 35 However, one of the most
29.
30.

TRIPS art. 31(b).
TRIPS art. 31(f).

31. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY: FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
IN ESSENTIAL DRUGS AND MEDICINES POLICY 2000-2003 7 (2000) [hereinafter WHO MEDICINES

STRATEGY],
2003.shtm
32.

available

at

http://www.who.int/medicines/strategy/medicinesstrategy2000-

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO 13TH MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES

(2003), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/par/edl]eml.shtml.
Other
categories include drugs to treat:
(1) Alimentary Tract and Metabolism; (2) Blood & Blood Forming Organs; (3) Cardiovascular
System; (4) Dermatologicals; (5) Genito Urinary System & Sex Hormones; (6) Systemic
Hormonal Preparations, Excl. Sex Hormones & Insulins; (7) Antiinfectives for Systemic Use; (8)
Antineoplastic & Inmmunomodulating Agents; (10) Musculo-Skeletal System; (11) Nervous
System; (12) Antiparasitic Products, Insecticides & Repellents; (13) Respiratory System; (14)
Sensory Organs; (15) Various or All Other Therapeutic Products.
Id.
33. WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY, supra note 31, at 9.
34. The WHO MEDICINES STRATEGY notes that only 10.3 percent of Sub-Saharan African
countries and 27.3 percent of Asian countries (excluding China and India) offer health insurance
coverage for drugs. Id at 39.
35. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION & WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SECRETARIATS,
REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS (Apr.

2001) ('Locally available health services, adequately staffed, equipped, managed and financed,
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significant factors is price.
Indeed, price can be considered a
"gateway" factor because better education, distribution and
compliance are meaningless if the drugs are not affordable. In fact,
the WHO Model List is underinclusive because it excludes some
expensive newer treatments that remain covered by patents. 36 Thus,
the number of people who lack access to medicines that can be
considered "essential" can be considered larger than the two billion
37
cited by the WHO.
In many developing countries the costs of drugs can equal 50
percent or more of a person's annual income. 38 In some cases, the cost
of drugs is simply beyond a household's ability to bear 39 or may
present a choice between drugs and food. In Thailand, for example,
prior to the entry of generic competition, Fluconazole, a drug used to
treat an opportunistic infection that is particularly prevalent in Thai
AIDS patients, cost $14 USD per daily dose, or approximately $434
USD per month. 40 The typical monthly wage of a Thai office worker is
equivalent to $120 USD, making the treatment prohibitively
expensive. 41 Policies that result in lower prices for pharmaceuticals in
developing countries thus represent a crucial step towards increasing
access to essential medicines.

and oriented to local means and priorities, as well as efficient distribution systems and tariff and
tax-free treatment for drugs are some of the other factors that play an important role in enabling
access on the basis of medical need."), at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/edu-genderal/whowho-hosbjor/hos-sessions.html.
36. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 12T- EXPERT COMMITTEE ON THE SELECTION AND USE OF
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, 15-19 April 2002, available at http://www.WHO.intimedicines/
organizationlpar/edllprocedures.shtml; see also Kelley A. Friedgen, Rethinking the Struggle
Between Health & Intellectual Property, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 689, 694 (2002) ("Part of the
WHO EDL classification is cost-effectiveness.").
37. Many nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") are pressing for a broader definition of
"essential" that would not include any affordability criteria. See Mediciens Sans Frontiers, The
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, Frequently Asked Questions, Question 18
(discussing that many "essential" drugs are not included on the "off-patent" list because they are
too expensive), at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/faq.shtm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
38. OxFAM, GENERIC COMPETITION, PRICE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: THE CASE FOR
ANTIRETROVIRALS IN UGANDA 7 (2002), at
http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp020710_
no26_generic-competition-briefing-paper.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 15, at 47 (noting that the annual cost of advanced
antiretroviral medicine in South Africa where one in eight is infected with HIV/AIDS is $12,000,
far beyond the means of most South Africans).
40. David Wilson et al., Global Trade and Access to Medicines: AIDS Treatments in
Thailand, 354 THE LANCET 1893, 1893 (1999).
41. Id.
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The Essential Medicines R&D Problem and International
Orphans

Another intractable problem in global health is the presence of
"orphan" conditions for which private industry conducts little or no
significant research and development. For example, there are no
effective treatments for many tropical infectious and parasitic
diseases. 42 Between 1975 and 1999, less than 1 percent of the almost
1,400 new drugs approved by regulatory agencies in the U.S. and
Europe were approved to treat such tropical diseases. 43 The bacteria
and parasites that cause these diseases are generally
well
understood, and effective treatments could be developed for them. In
fact, old treatments exist for some of these diseases, but they often
44
have severe side effects.
42. See Patrice Trouiller et al, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases:A Deficient Market
and a Public-healthPolicy Failure,359 THE LANCET 2188, 2188 (2002) (noting "tropical diseases
such as malaria, leishmaniasis, lymphatic filariasis, Chagas' disease and schistosomiasis
continue to cause significant morbidity and mortality, mainly in the developing world."); Centers
for Disease Control, Traveler's Health, Diseases, at http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2005) (noting diseases such as malaria, leishmaniasis, lymphatic filariasis,
Chagas' disease, schistomsomiasis, and dengue). Malaria is caused by a parasite that can be
transmitted to humans via the bite of a malaria-infected mosquito. Centers for Disease Control,
Diseases
&
Conditions,
Malaria,
Frequently Asked
Questions,
at http://www.
cdc.gov/malaria/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). Malaria may cause serious complications
such as kidney failure and can be fatal if not property treated. Id. "Leishmaniasis" is a parasitic
disease transmitted by sand flies. Centers for Disease Control, Traveler's Health, Diseases,
Leishmaniasis, Fact Sheet, at http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases.htm#leish (last visited Apr.
19, 2005). It may affect the skin or internal organs. Id. "Lymphatic Filariasis," also known as
Elephantiasis, affects over 120 million people, over 40 million of whom have been seriously
incapacitated and disfigured.
Centers for Disease Control, Traveler's Health, Diseases,
Lymphatic
Filariasis,
Fact
Sheet,
at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/
lymphaticfilariasis/default.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
The disease primarily affects
populations in India, Africa, and Asia. Id. It is caused by parasitic worms that are transmitted
to humans by mosquitoes and lodge in the lymphatic system. Id. "Chagas Disease" is a parasitic
infection that affects 16-18 million people. Centers for Disease Control, Traveler's Health,
Diseases, Chagas Disease, Fact Sheet, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/chagasdisease/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). It is spread by insects that live in unsanitary housing.
Id. "Schistomsomiasis" is caused by flukes found in contaminated water. Chronic infections can
cause liver, intestinal tract, kidney, and lung damage. Centers for Disease Control, Traveler's
Health,
Diseases,
Schistomsomiasis,
Traveler's
Health
Information,
at
http://www.cdc.gov/travel/diseases/schisto.htm (lastvisited Apr. 19, 2005). "Dengue" and dengue
hemorrhagic fevers are viral infections spread by mosquitoes. Centers for Disease Control,
Diseases & Conditions, Dengue Fever, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidodldvbidldengue (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005).
43. Patrice Trouiller & Piero Olliaro, Drug Development Output from 1975 to 1996: What
Proportionfor Tropical Diseases?, 3 INT'L J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 61, 63 (1999).
44. See id. at 2189 (noting that the treatment for sleeping sickness, for example, is an
arsenic derivative that often has lethal side effects and is ineffective in 5 percent to 40 percent of
cases). Another problem is resistance where the number of available treatments is limited. The
efficacy of the first-line drug for visceral leishmaniasis in Northern India, for example, has
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The prevalence of these diseases makes their orphan status
somewhat surprising. A 1996 sampling of tropical diseases showed
that they accounted for 16.07 million deaths worldwide-30 percent of
the total 52 million deaths for all causes in that year. 45 The problem
is lack of targeted research and development. While total annual
worldwide drug research and development expenditures may exceed
$50 billion, less than $75 million is spent on research and
development each year for tropical diseases. 46 In fact, only 10 percent
of global research and development efforts are directed towards the
47
conditions that cause 90 percent of the global disease burden.
D.

The Current Balance Under TRIPS

The exceptions built into TRIPS, including the compulsory
licensing provisions, reflect a balance between developed countries'
concerns about incentives for innovation and the need in developing
countries to make essential technology available in times of crisis.
Representatives of developing countries and relief activists quickly
seized on these exceptions and argued that the "national emergency"
provision in TRIPS can be applied to the essential medicines
problem. 48 This proposition initially met with some resistance from
some developed countries who argued that a "national emergency"
implies an unusual and temporally limited incident, such as a war or
49
drought, rather than a long-term public health issue.

declined to approximately 70 percent. MPZDECINS SANS FRONTI2RES, CONFERENCE SUMMARY,
THE CRISIS OF NEGLECTED DISEASES: DEVELOPING TREATMENTS AND ENSURING ACCESS 1 (March

12-14, 2002), availableat http://www.neglecteddiseases.org/summary.pdf.
45. Bernard P~coul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries-A Lost Battle?, 281
JAMA 361, 362 (1999).
46. Trouiller, supra note 43, at 2189.
47. DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES WORKING GROUP, M9DECINS SANS FRONTIkRES,
FATAL IMBALANCE: THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 10

(2001), at http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatal.pdf. This has been dubbed the "10/90
gap."
Global
Forum
for
Health
Research,
The
10/90
Gap, Now,
at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/site/003._The%2010%2090%20gap/001._Now.php (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005).
48. James Thuo Gathi, Construing Intellectual Property Rights & Competition Policy
Consistently With FacilitatingAccess To Affordable AIDS Drugs To Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA.
L. REV. 727, 747 (2001).
49. CARLOS M. CORREA, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1-3 (Health Economics & Drugs

EDM Series No. 12, 2002), available at http://www.who.int/medicinesflibrary/par/ who-edm-par2002-3/doha-implications.pdf.
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The debate over the "national emergency" exception led to the
Doha, Quatar Ministerial Conference in 2001.50 In what was widely
seen as a triumph for developing and least developed countries
("LDCs"), 5 1 the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (commonly called the "Doha Declaration"), adopted on
November 14, 2001, confirmed that members are free to determine
what constitutes a "national emergency or other circumstance of
extreme urgency" and that such circumstances may arise through a
52
health crisis such as HIV/AIDS.
The Doha Ministerial also acknowledged that the "domestic
use" limitation on compulsory licensing would limit the value of this
exception for many developing countries and LDCs that do not have
sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity. Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration instructed the WTO Council for TRIPS 53 to find a solution
to this problem-which came to be called the "Article 6 problem"-before
54
the end of 2002.
The Article 6 problem was not solved by the end of 2002, but
instead generated a debate that further polarized the North and
South. Developing countries and LDCs from the South, led by a group
of African nations and supported by a number of activist NGOs, seized
on the broad language of Article 30 of TRIPS 55 and proposed that
compulsory licenses be permitted for both domestic use and for export
to regional trade groups in response to any public health crisis or
50. The Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest-level decisionmaking body. It meets
at least once every two years, as required by the WTO's founding charter, the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
World Trade Organization,
Understanding the WHO: The Organization, Who's WHO Is It Anyway?, at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/minist-e.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
51. Id. (stating that an LDC is a developing country that is listed by the United Nations as
"least developed" because of a very low level of economic development). Of the forty-five
designated LDCs on the United Nation list, thirty are WTO members, committed to the TRIPS
agreements. Id.
52. Id. The text states that "[e]ach member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,
can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency." World Trade
Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, para. 5c,
WT/MIN(01)JDEC/2 (adopted Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/mindecl-trips-e.htm.
53. The Council for TRIPS is responsible for reporting to the WTO General Council on
issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of TRIPS. See Uruguay Round
Agreement art. 68 (1994), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm.
54. Doha Declaration, supra note 52, para. 6.
55. TRIPS article 30 states, 'Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
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other emergency.56 The North saw this as an effort to rewrite TRIPS
57
and undercut the harmonization of IPRs.
On December 16, 2002, the Chairman of the Council for Trips,
Perez Motta, circulated a compromise proposal to which all but the
U.S. eventually, if reluctantly, agreed. 58 Negotiations stalled until the
summer of 2003 because of the U.S. position.
Eventually, under pressure from negative public opinion, the
U.S. suggested it would be willing to drop its demand for a list of
specific diseases if the exception were available only to a small group
of LDCs. Initially, Southern nations and NGO activists expressed
unwillingness to accept this condition.5 9 However, on August 30,
56. Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, Proposal on Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C[W/351, (June 24, 2002),
at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/ip/c/w351.doc;
Letter from Medecins Sans
Frontieres et al., to the TRIPS Council (Jan. 2002) (on file with author).
57. The United States proposed that Article 31 be modified to allow exports under
compulsory licenses for a limited set of diseases, or, preferably, that developed countries agree to
a moratorium on enforcement of TRIPS on a case-by-case basis when presented with a public
health crisis. Second Communication from the United States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/CJW/358 (July 9, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/PressReleases/2002/June/asset-upload file8O8-2
021.pdf; Communication from the United States, Moratorium to Address Needs of Developing
and Least-Developed Members With No or Insufficient Manufacturing Capacities in the
Pharmaceutical Sector, IP/CIW/396 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at http://www.cptech.
org/iplwto/p6/us01142003.doc. The European Community initially looked to Article 30 for a
solution, but subsequently favored an amendment of Article 31. Communication from the
European Communities and Their Member States, to the TRIPS Council Relating to Paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (June 18, 2002), at
http://europa.eu.int/commltrade/miti/intell/intel3.htm.
58. Note from the Chairman, Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Dec. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancundocs/TRIPSpara6_16-12-02.pdf. Motta's proposal would
have allowed LDCs to import generic drugs made under compulsory license in a developing
country to treat the kinds of "epidemics" referred to in paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration. Id.
The Motta proposal also would have required importing countries to adopt measures to prevent
re-exportation of the generic goods to other markets. Id. The EC was willing to accept the Motta
text, as was the African Group. Letter of Pascal Lamy, Member of the European Commission, to
TRIPS
Council
(Jan.
7,
2003),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comn/trade
/issues/global/medecine/docs/plletter.pdf; Communication from the African, Caribbean, and
Pacific Group of States (ACP), Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public
Health, IP/C/W/401 (May 28, 2003),
available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/ddfdocuments/t/ip/c/w401.doc. The United States, however, rejected the Motta proposal
because it would have left the diseases to which an exception could apply open-ended. The U.S.
continued to insist on a limited defined list of conditions. Letter from Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade
Representative, to Trade Ministers on Terms for a Moratorium (Dec. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/zoellick12272002.html.
59. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Project on Technology, US Government Efforts to
Limit the Scope of Diseases in the Implementation of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Have Outraged the Public Health Community, and Have Been Presented in a Highly
Dishonest Way by the White House and USTR, Damaging US Reputation Abroad (Mar. 5, 2003)
(criticizing the U.S. Government's attempt to not expand the list of diseases covered under the
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2003, the TRIPS Council Chairman announced that a compromise
60
decision had been reached.
The August 30 decision itself does not appear to place any new
61
limitations on when a compulsory license might be appropriate.
However, the Decision includes significant procedural requirements,
including detailed notification to the TRIPS council of the type and
quantity of the product licensed, a certification that the importing
member lacks domestic manufacturing capacity, and distinctive
labeling and packaging of the generic product. 62 The responsibility to
provide "adequate remuneration" to the patent owner continues as
under Article 31(h) of TRIPS, but extends only to the exporting
member. 63
The Decision also contains a series of overlapping review
mechanisms. Any member may request review of the measures
64
established under the Decision in the Council for TRIPS at any time.
In addition, the Council on TRIPS will automatically conduct an
annual review of the system. 65 The Decision will terminate when

Doha Declaration
on TRIPS and public health),
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto
/p6/cptechO3O52003.html.
60. See Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter August 30 Decision] (describing the
agreed
upon
terms),
at
http://www.mpo.cz/xqw/webdav/-UTF8-/dms-mpo/getDoc
Preview/1 1334/9643/80278/?filemodify=2003-10-22%2014:22:36.
61. In fact, the Decision states that "a Member may notify at any time that it will use the
system in whole or in a limited way, for example only in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use." Id. para. 1(b).
62. The importing member's notification to the TRIPS Council must include "the names and
expected quantities of the product(s) needed," and except in the case of an LDC, must establish
that the importing country has "insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question." Id. para. 2(a)(i.ii). LDCs are presumed to
meet this requirement. Id. Annex. This latter requirement can be met by showing that the
importing member "has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector" or that any
existing capacity "is currently insufficient for the purpose of meeting its needs." Id. In addition
to these requirements, the importing country must issue its own compulsory license under
Article 31 of TRIPS. Id. para. 2(a)(iii). The exporting member also must issue a compulsory
license, which must permit the manufacture of only the amount necessary to meet the importing
member's needs. Id. The exporting member's compulsory license further must require that
products produced under the license be distinguished through special labeling, packaging or
product trade dress, "provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a significant
impact on price." Id. In addition to these requirements in the compulsory license terms,
importing members must "take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their
administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the
products that have actually been imported into their territories under the system." Id. para. 4.
Developed country members must provide "technical and financial cooperation" to LDCs or
developing country members that "experienc[e] difficulty in implementing this provision." Id.
63. Id. para. 3.
64. Id. para. 5.
65. Id. para. 8.
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TRIPS is amended to address the issues covered by the Decision. 66
Originally, the TRIPS Council was to adopt an amendment before the
end of 2003 based "where appropriate" on the Decision. 67 Continued
disagreement over the scope and implementation of any such
amendment has pushed the amendment deadline back to March
2005.68
The August 30 Decision is further clarified and narrowed by an
accompanying General Council Chairperson's Statement. 69
The
Chairperson's statement first notes that the system established under
the Decision is to be used "in good faith to protect the public health"
and not as "an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy
objectives." 70 In addition, the Chairperson's statement extends the
labeling and packaging requirements in the Decision to active
pharmaceutical ingredients and finished products using such
ingredients as well as to finished products. 71 The statement attaches
a list of "best practices" that demonstrate the kinds of labeling and
packaging that could distinguish products produced under a
compulsory license.
These "best practices" are examples of
distinguishing strategies
used by
Northern pharmaceutical
manufactures on products supplied under donation or tiered pricing
programs and include unique imprints, prominently displayed brand
names, distinct outer packaging, and unique shape and color of pills.72
The Chairperson's statement also adds the requirement that an
importing member include in its notification to the TRIPS Council
information on how the Member established its lack of domestic
manufacturing capacity.
In addition to the regular review process built into the
Decision, the Chairperson's Statement allows any Member to bring to
the TRIPS Council's attention "any matter related to the
66. Id. para. 11.
67. Id.
68. TRIPS Council: Key Developing Countries Seek to Move Debate Forward on Disclosure
Issues, 8 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE DIGEST, para. 2 (Sept. 22, 2004), at http://www.ictsd.ore/
weekly/04-09-22/storyl.htm.
69. See Statement of General Council Chairperson, WT/GCM/82 (Nov. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Chairperson's August 30 Statement] (excerpting from the minutes of the General
Council meeting Aug. 30, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/gc-stat_
30aug03-e.htm.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. attachment (listing best practices); see also CARLOS M. CORREA, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF
THE DOHA DECLARATION AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON PUBLIC HEALTH (Apr. 2004) (discussing

anti-diversion measures),
_2004.4_(2).pdf.

available at

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHOEDMPAR
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interpretation or implementation of the Decision" so that the TRIPS
Council can take "appropriate action. ' 73 A Member also can make an
informal appeal to the Chairperson if it believes the Decision's
74
requirements have not been met.
Finally, the Chairperson's Statement notes that a number of
developed country members have agreed not to use the system as
importers and that twelve other countries have agreed to use the
system as importers only "in situations of national emergency or other
75
circumstances of extreme urgency."
Activist organizations advocating a broad reading of the Doha
Declaration were outraged by the Decision and Chairperson's
Statement.76
They believed the Decision and Statement were
"designed to offer comfort to the US and the Western pharmaceutical
industry." 77
In particular, activists criticized the Chairperson's
"statement of purpose," which apparently excludes any industrial or
commercial objectives as improper efforts to restrict generic
competition.7 8 Activists also criticized the anti-diversion provisions as
unnecessary and costly. 79 Finally, activists questioned the ability of
nonexporting or importing members to seek review of issues relating
to the system in the TRIPS Council and of the Council's power to take
80
action in response to such petitions.
The pharmaceutical industry in developing countries also did
not welcome the compromise. The Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance's
secretary general, D.G. Shah, has stated that the anti-diversion
packaging requirements and the uncertainty of the appeal process to

73. Chairperson's August 30 Statement, supra note 69.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Northern nations that have opted out of the system as importers are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The nations that have agreed to
limit their use of the system are Hong Kong, China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao, China,
Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
Matsu, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Id.
76. Press Release, Oxfam International, Flawed WTO Drugs Deal Will Do Little to Secure
Access to Medicines in Developing Countries (Aug. 30, 2003) (stating that the WTO solution is an
unworkable solution), at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pr030830_wtofinal.htm.
77. Id. (quoting Ellen 't Hoen of Medecins Sans Frontiers).
78. E.g., Medecins Sans Frontieres, Chairman's Text Brings New Difficulties to WTO
'Paragraph6,' (Aug. 27, 2003) (calling on WTO members to reject the Chairperson's new
statement of purpose), at http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=77830ACA-8EC5-419A82AB7D7ED6A2E1ED.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the TRIPS Council will make the sale of generic drugs to LDC
8
markets by Indian firms excessively costly. '
The compromise reflected in the Decision and Chairperson's
Statement leaves unanswered a number of difficult questions. In
particular, the TRIPS Council's role in resolving disputes seems
problematic. It is unclear, for example, exactly how distinctive export
packaging must be and whether a member can seek an injunction
against exportation if the packaging is in question. Likewise, it is
unclear how and on what basis a dispute about an importing
member's true domestic production capacity might be resolved.
Perhaps most significantly, the Decision and Statement's
prenotification and labeling requirements may limit the development
of a dynamic generic export market. Generic markets work because of
competition.8 2 The Decision and Statement appear to establish a
quasiregulatory framework that may limit the flexibility of generic
firms in developing countries to respond to demand in LDCs. In effect,
the Decision and Statement institutionalize a forced donation program
rather than a market-based solution.
The August 30 Decision is not the last word on this issue. It
was taken as a provisional measure until the current round of trade
talks is completed, at which time member nations will discuss formal
amendment of TRIPS to incorporate agreements reached during the
round.
It is unclear whether the August 30 Decision will be
incorporated without significant modifications in any eventual
amendment of TRIPS. In fact, the dissatisfaction voiced by many
constituencies was intensified by the collapse of the Cancun
83
ministerial meeting in September 2003 over agricultural issues.
Some developing nations felt that they had made compromises on the

81. Drug Firms See Red on WTO Deal, Bus. STD., Aug. 29, 2003, at http://www.businessstandard.com/search/storypage new.php?leftnm=lmnul&leftindx=l&lselect=0&autono=l40239;
The WTO Accord is Anti-Indian Pharma, Bus. STD, Sept. 5, 2003, at http://www.businessstandard.com/bsonline/storypage.php?autono=140784.
82.

See generally DAVID REIFFEN & MICHAEL R. WARD, GENERIC DRUG INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

(Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 248, 2002) (using the generic drug
industry as a way to illustrate how competition evolved within a market), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC
DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002) (stating that the FTC has

"taken an active role in ensuring that consumers benefit from competition in the pharmaceutical
industry"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O02/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf;
CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND

RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1998) (examining the extent to which competition
from generic drugs has increased since the passing of the Hatch-Waxman Act and how
competition
has
affected
the
returns
from
creating
a
drug),
available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xxldoc655/pharm.pdf.
83. Mark Davis, WTO Keen to Restart Trade Talks, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 17 2003, at 17.
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essential medicines issue in order to facilitate negotiations on the
agricultural issues.8 4 They felt betrayed when the agricultural talks
floundered at Cancun. s5 It remains to be seen how the issue
ultimately will be resolved. Moreover, as discussed in the next Section
of this Article, the August 30 Decision ignores the question of whether
patents are needed in connection with technologies such as essential
medicines.
III. DRUGS AND THE PATENTS COMPLEX
As the discussion above illustrates, the August 30 Decision is
at best a stopgap solution to the essential medicines problem as it
relates to patent policy. Moreover, neither the August 30 Decision nor
the Doha Declaration include any measures that might help remedy
the international orphan drug problem. A more comprehensive review
of the patent system is required-a review that takes into account the
true workings of the international market for pharmaceutical
products. This Part presents such a review, including an overview of
the pharmaceuticals market in the North and South and a case study
of how differences in those markets have impacted patient access to
AIDS drugs.
A. Drugs and the Patents Complex in the North
The costs of developing a new drug, by any estimate, are high.
One recent study, which has been the subject of some debate, claims
that the average cost of researching, developing, and introducing a
new drug is $802 million.8 6 Other studies have suggested the costs are
closer to $450 million-lower, but still high.8 7
Pharmaceutical

84. John Authers & Guy de Jonquires, With the Prioritiesof Member Nations Conflicting
Sharply, Agreement May Prove Elusive, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at 19; see also News Story by
Aimee Pease Fox & Zoe McLaren, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Despite Trade Talk Failure, Development Agenda on Track (Oct. 7, 2003) (explaining that
negotiations at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting fell through in part because of the
polarization of the views on agriculture), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/
news/2003/tradetalkscid_100703.htm.
85. See, e.g., US Cheap Medicine Deal Fails to End WTO Row Over Farming Subsidies, THE
BUS., Aug. 31, 2003, at 7.
86. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH
ECON. 151 (2003), available at http://www.sciencedirect.comscience
/article/B6V8K-47P93T9-2/2/3b731117e9fa75023de1845303a03cbf/.
87. E.g., U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS
AND REWARDS 214 (1993) ("Total estimated preclinical pharmaceutical R&D constituted
approximately $450 million in 1988."); at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl
/-ota/diskl/1993/9336/9336.PDF.
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producers in the North cite strong patent protection as the bedrock of
They identify patents as a key mechanism for
their business.8s
recouping their research and development costs.8 9
A
Sales of new drugs in the North can vary widely.
"blockbuster" drug can reach sales in the billions. The top decile of
compounds introduced from 1990-1994, for example, had sales of over
$2.5 billion. 9° Typically, these blockbuster drugs are the first or
second entries that represent a significant therapeutic advance in
treating a disease with a large market size. 91 Pharmaceutical
companies in the North rely heavily on large returns from these
blockbuster drugs to recoup their research and development costs and
to make a profit.
Not all drugs, of course, are blockbusters. In fact, the mean
sales of compounds introduced from 1990-1994 peaked at $458
million. 92 Many of these compounds are variations on an existing
treatment-"me too" drugs-or represent incremental advances on
existing treatments. These lesser-selling compounds are important
because they will contribute to the firm's bottom line as long as sales
Lesser-selling
exceed the variable cost of producing them. 93
compounds thus enable firms to remain in business until they produce
94
another, more profitable, blockbuster.
These "blockbuster" business model dynamics are reflected in
the research and development ("R&D") initiatives that Northern
pharmaceutical companies choose to pursue and in the historical
pattern of regulatory approvals in developed countries. 95 According to
the industry trade group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), for example, the U.S. Food and Drug

88. E.g., Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Intellectual Property:
Overview ("Pharmaceutical companies rely on government-granted patents to protect their huge
investments in researching and developing new drugs."), at http://www.phrma.org/issues/intprop/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
89. See, e.g., id. (stating that eliminating patents "would seriously impact the
pharmaceutical companies' ability to recoup their costs and reinvest in other research projects").
90. Henry Grabowski et al., Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug
Introductions, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS SUPPL. 17 (2002).
91. Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, The Distribution of Sales Revenues from
PharmaceuticalInnovation, 18 PHARMACOECONOMICS SUPPL. 23, 23- 24 (2000).
92. Grabowski, supra note 90, at 17.
93. Id. at 23.
94.

Id.

95. The regulatory approval information may be more telling than figures on R&D
initiatives. According to PhRMA, only 250 out of every 5,000 to 10,000 screened compounds
enter preclinical testing. Of these 250, only 5 enter clinical testing and only 1 is approved by the
FDA.
PhRMA 2003 PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 3 (2003), available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profileO2/index.cfm.
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Administration
("FDA") approved eighty-nine new medicines in
2002.96 Seventeen of these drugs were new molecular entities and
nine were new biologics. 97 The new drugs included treatments for
heart disease, cancer, AIDS-related infections, chronic renal failure,
migraine headaches, schizophrenia, rheumatoid arthritis, irritable
bowl syndrome, pediatric attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and
narcolepsy. 9 8 The remaining 172 approvals were for new indications
of previously approved drugs. 99
B. The PharmaceuticalIndustry in the South
Generic firms dominate the Pharmaceutical Industry in the
South. A prime example of this domination is in India. There are
over 250 pharmaceutical manufacturers with more than 20,000
manufacturing facilities in India. 10 0 Although these firms primarily
focus on generic and bulk drugs, some also conduct original research
and development.
The leading Indian firm, Ranbaxy Ltd., is an excellent example
of a thriving Southern pharmaceutical firm. Ranbaxy reported global
sales of $764 million USD in 2002.101 Its principal products are
generic pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients.
However, Ranbaxy's vision is to become a research based international
pharmaceutical company, and it has set a goal of developing one
investigational new drug every twelve to eighteen months. 102 The

96. PhRMA, New Medicines in Development, New Drug Approvals in 2002 [hereinafter
New
Drug
Approvals
in
20021,
at
http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/surveys.
cfm?newmedsrindex=55&first=drugs (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
97. Id. A "new molecular entity" is "a medication containing an active substance that has
never before been approved for marketing in any form in the United States." Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Food & Drug Admin., FDA's Drug Review and Approval Times, at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm (last updated July 30, 2001). A "new
biologic" is a new treatment derived from biological sources rather than from chemical synthesis.
Food & Drug Admin., Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research: About Us, at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
98. Id.
99. New Drug Approvals in 2002, supranote 96.
100. CIPLA LTD., 2001-2002 ANNUAL REPORT 2 [hereinafter CIPLA LTD. ANNUAL REPORT], at
http://www.cipla.com/aboutus/annualreport/PDF/ANNUALRP.pdf;
see also JEAN 0. LANJOUW,
YALE UNIV. & THE NBER, THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN INDIA:
"HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR AND SUFFERING?" 8 (NBER Working Paper No. 6366)

(noting that there are 250 large pharmaceutical firms in India), available at http://www.
oiprc.ox.ac.uk/JLWP0799.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
101. RANBAXY LABORATORIES LTD., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 12 [hereinafter RANBAXY 2002
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ranbaxy.com/irannualreports.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2005).
102. Id. at 27.
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company reports original research and development efforts in urology
(incontinence) and respiratory (asthma and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease) drugs and in broad spectrum anti-bacterials
103
intended for respiratory pathogens.
The Indian firm, Cipla, Ltd., is another good example of a
strong Southern pharmaceutical firm. Cipla reported over $300
Million USD in gross sales in 2002.104 It has general manufacturing
and research and development facilities in Mumbai, Bangalore,
Patalganga, and Kurkumbh. 10 5
It offers prescription medicines
10 6
ranging from abortofacients to urological products.
Despite their wide range of products and significant research
and manufacturing capabilities, neither Ranbaxy nor Cipla sell any
drugs designed to prevent or treat tropical diseases. Both firms,
however, make generic AIDS drugs. Cipla's principal antiretroviral
product, called TRIOMUNE, is a combination of generic formulations
of Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine. 10 7
Ranbaxy sells
Neviparine and Lamivudine as well as Zidovudine and Abacavir.10 8
There is little direct data on the profitability of the generic
drug industry as a whole in developing countries. If it is at all similar
to the generic industry in the North, profit levels for individual firms
will depend heavily on whether the firm is an early generic entrant.
Northern generic firms that are early entrants are able to obtain rents
of 20 percent to 30 percent above marginal cost until increasing
numbers of entrants drive prices down to marginal cost. 0 9 Rents fall
as more entrants produce generic versions of the same drug, and
prices approach marginal cost when there are eight to ten
competitors. 110

103. Id. at 26-27.
104. CIPLA LTD. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 100, at 40. The $30 Million USD figure is
based on the reported 2002 sales of $1,428,869 Rupees and the August, 2003 exchange rate.
105. Cipla Ltd., Corporate Profile, Our Facilities, at http://www.cipla.com/corporateprofile/
facilities.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
106. Cipla
Ltd.,
Our
Products,
Prescription,
http://www.cipla.com/admin.php?
mode=cat&action=disp&id=2 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005); see Part III.C., infra, for a further
discussion of these compounds.
107. Cipla Doc, Scientific Dossiter, Triomune 30/40, at http://www.cipladoc.com/publications/
scientificdossier/triomune/triomunel.htm#product (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
108. RANBAXY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 52.
109. REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 82, at 3-4.
110. Id.
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C. The AIDS-Drug Case Study
The sale of generic versions of antiretroviral drugs by Cipla
and Ranbaxy serves as a useful case study of patents and the access
problem. There is no vaccine or cure for HIV/AIDS. There are,
however, treatments that inhibit the AIDS virus' replication. These
treatments, called antiretrovirals, often prolong and significantly
increase the quality of the lives of the patients that take them.
One important class of antiretrovirals is the nucleoside analog
reverse transcriptase inhibitors ("NRTI"). This class of drugs blocks
HIV replication by inhibiting the function of a viral protein.'1 1 NRTIs
are often taken in combination with other antiretrovirals in a
"cocktail" intended to provide a broad range of treatment mechanisms
against viral strains that may have become resistant to a single drug.
Antiretrovirals are big business.
Patents owned by
multinational pharmaceutical companies protect the product positions
in this field.' 12 Stavudine, for example, is an NRTI sold under the
brand name ZERIT by Bristol-Myers Squibb in the U.S. and Canada.
The patent for the use of Stavudine to treat patients infected with
retroviruses was awarded to three Yale University researchers in
1990 and subsequently was assigned to Yale. 113 Yale has a marketing
and development agreement for this compound with BMS.11 4 BMS
reported over $1.5 billion in worldwide sales of ZERIT during the
5
years 2000-2002.1
Another
important
NRTI,
Lamivudine,
is
sold by
GlaxoSmithKline individually under the brand name EPIVIR and in

111. ZERIT,
Glossary,
at
http://www.zerit.com/managehiv/zeritthome/glossary.jsp
#nucleoside-analog-reverse transcriptase-inhibitors (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
112. The following table identifies the generic names, brand names, and manufacturers of
the antiretroviral drugs discussed in this section:
Generic Name
Brand Name
Brand Manufacturer
Stavudine
ZERIT
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Lamivudine
EPIVIR / COMBIVIR
GlaxoSmithKline
Zidovudine
RETROVIR / COMBIVIR / GlaxoSmithKline
TRIZIVIR (AZT)
Abacavir
ZIAGEN / TRIZIVIR
GlaxoSmithKline
113. U.S. Patent No. 4,978,655 (issued Dec. 18, 1990).
114. Donald McNeil, Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.12,
2001, at Al.
115. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 2002 SEC Form 10-K, Apr. 4, 2003, at 3, [hereinafter
Bristol-Myers 2002 SEC Form 10-K] available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/14272/000104746903010810/a2 106681z10-k.htm.
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combination with Zidovudine as COMBIVIR. 1 16
Zidovudine,
commonly called "AZT," is an NRTI also sold by Glaxo. 117 A patent
covering the Lamivudine compound and a method for using that
compound to treat HIV infection is owned by JAF Biochem
International, Inc. and is licensed to Glaxo. 118 Another patent was
awarded to Emory University in 1993 that covers the synthesis of
enantiomers of this compound. 119
Zidovudine is sold by Glaxo
individually under the brand name RETROVIR and as a component of
COMBIVIR. 120 A method patent for the treatment of AIDS with
Zidovudine was issued in 1988 and is now held by Glaxo. 12 1 Glaxo
holds the patent on yet another NRTI, Abacavir that is sold under the
brand name ZIAGEN. 122 ZIAGEN also is sold in combination with
COMBIVIR under the brand name TRIZIVIR. Glaxo reported over
$10 billion in worldwide sales of antiviral products during the years
2000-2002.123
The lowest worldwide price for the triple combination "cocktail"
of Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine 124 was $10,439 per patient

116. TreatHIV.com, Products, Combivir, at http://www.treathiv.com/combivir/pillchart.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
117. Id.
118. U.S. Patent No. 5,047,407 (issue Sept. 10, 1991).
119. U.S. Patent No. 5,539,116 (issued July 23, 1996).
120. TreatHIV.com, supra note 116.
121. U.S. Patent No. 4,724,232 (Feb. 9, 1988). The patent initially was owned by Burroughs
Wellcome Co. and now belongs to Glaxo as the result of a merger. GlaxoSmithKline, About
GlaxoSmithKline, Our Heritage, at http://www.gsk.comlabout/background.htm (last visited Apr.
19, 2005). The 232 patent was the subject of litigation concerning whether a NIH researcher
should have been named as a co-inventor. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs, 40 F.3d
1223, 1227 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1070 (1996) (discussing the particulars of joint
invention).
122. GlaxoSmithKline, Products, Prescription Medicines, Ziagen, at http://www.gsk.com/
products/ziagen.us.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
123. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2002 SEC Form 20-F, Mar. 28, 2003, at 8, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 131399/000102123103000405/b701404-20f.htm.
The
USD figure provided is based on a conversion of British Pounds where 1 USD = 0.6 GBP. Glaxo
also includes AGENERASE, a protease inhibitor for the treatment of HIV, ZEFFIX, a treatment
for chronic hepatitis B, and VALTREX, a treatment for chicken pox, shingles, cold sores and
genital herpes in the antiviral category. Glaxo does not provide separate sales figures for these
products. If the eight brands listed under Glaxo's antiviral category account for a roughly equal
share of the total category sales, the five drugs we are considering would account for $6.25 billion
in sales.
124. Nevirapine is sold by Boehringer-Ingelheim under the brand name VIRAMUNE.
Boehringer-Ingelheim, Products, Prescription Medicines, HIV/AIDS, at http://www.boehringeringelheim.com/corporate/products/prod-prescr-aids.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). A patent
covering the Nevirapine compound and a method for using that compound to treat HIV infection
was issued in 1994 and is owned by Boehringer-Ingelheim. U.S. Patent No. 5,366,972 (issued
Nov. 22, 1994). Boehringer-Ingelheim sales data for VIRAMUNE is not available from public
sources.
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per year when it was first introduced in 2000.125 However, the initial
cost to reverse engineer these drugs is relatively low, and the cost to
manufacture them is even lower. Most bulk suppliers and generic
manufacturers quickly learned how to make them by studying
126
available scientific literature.
In September 2000, perhaps as a combination humanitarian
gesture and public relations coup, Cipla began offering this
combination to certain NGOs and LDCs in countries without effective
patent protection for $350 per patient per year. 127 By October 2000,
the originator's lowest worldwide price had dropped to $727 per
patient per year. 128 Other generic competitors subsequently entered
the global market, including Ranbaxy at a price of $295 per patient
per year.
Even the prices offered by Cipla and Ranbaxy, however, are
well above marginal cost. When bought in bulk, an annual course of
treatment with a single NRTI can be as low as $30.129 This suggests
that production costs are equal to or less than $30, depending on
market concentration.
The figures relating to these AIDS cocktail drugs illustrate
that the patent owner is able to obtain significantly higher prices in
the Northern market and thereby to earn substantial profits. The
lower prices available in developing countries demonstrate how
generic competition can affect prices in those markets. 130 The further
125. MEDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES,
ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN,
UNTANGLING THE WEB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES
CAMPAIGN].

126. See Melody Peterson, Lifting the Curtainon the Real Costs of Making AIDS Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at C1 (reporting on successful effort of ACIC Pharmaceuticals in Canada to
reverse engineer AZT and sell it in bulk to South American countries).
127. See, e.g., Press Release, Kenya Coalition on Access to Essential Medicine, NGOs
Denounce the Lack of Transparency in Multi-national/ UNAIDS ARV Drug deal for Kenya (Feb.
21, 2001) ("Last week, CIPLA, the generic Indian manufacturer, offered to sell a Triple-Therapy
combination (D4T, 3TC and Nevirapine) of antiretrovirals (ARVs) for 350$ per patient per year
to MSF (Mediciens Sans Frontiers), if then donated, and for 600$ per patient per year to
governments."),
available
at
http://www.globaltreatmentaccess.org/content/press-releases/0 1/022101-KE-ARVUNAIDS.html
128. ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN, supra note 125, at 7.
129. The $30 figure is based on a cost of $1,000 per kilogram, assuming that one kilogram
can be used to make enough pills to treat approximately thirty patients per year. See id. (noting
that bulk prices to Brazil for Stavudine were $800 to $1,000 per kilogram, with a kilogram being
sufficient to make enough pills to treat thirty-four patients for one year).
130. There is substantial evidence that patented drugs are priced significantly higher than
generic or non-patented drugs in developing country markets. In Thailand, for example,
Fluconazole, a drug used to treat an opportunistic infection that is particularly prevalent in Thai
AIDS patients, cost $14 USD per daily dose, or approximately $434 USD per month. Wilson et
al., supra note 40. When generic competition was introduced, three local Thai pharmaceutical
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discount in price offered by the generic competitors themselves show
that there is yet more room for discounting in developing countries.
Sources of supply of treatments for some Southern pandemics, such as
HIV/AIDS, therefore do exist. 131 As to these treatments, the problem
is demand, and more specifically, the elasticity of demand. The next
Section explains the problem of demand elasticity.
IV. THE DEMAND ELASTICITY PROBLEM
Demand elasticity is defined as the responsiveness of demand
to a change in a factor that determines demand. 132 Price elasticity of
demand-the manner in which changes in price affect changes in
demand-is the focus here. Where a change in price has a relatively
significant affect on demand, demand is said to be "price elastic."
Where a change in price has a relatively insignificant effect on
13 3
demand, demand is said to be "price inelastic."'
Demand for health care services in the North is generally price
inelastic. 13 4 A recent survey of empirical literature in the United
States and Canada found that the price elasticity of demand for health
companies entered the market, and the price dropped to approximately $6 USD per daily dose within reach of many households. Id. Similarly, the price of the antiretroviral drug Zidovudine
fell from $324 USD to $87 USD in Thailand when a generic alternative was introduced. Id.
Another recent study shows that the lowest world prices for branded triple-combination AIDS
drugs has dropped from $10,439 per patient per year to $727 per patient per year, with a steep
decline after the introduction of generic competition from Cipla. ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES CAMPAIGN, supra note 124, at 7. Cipla and Ranbaxy offer generic versions of the
treatments for $350 and $295 per patient per year, respectively. Id. This is consistent with
domestic experience in the United States. A Congressional Budget Office study found that
generics cost on average one-fourth less than brand name drugs. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 82, at 28.
131. The issue is different with respect to AIDS vaccine research. The most prevalent
strains of AIDS in the South are not prevalent in the North. International AIDS Vaccine
Initiative, Progress & Challenges, The State of Global Research, Progress Towards an AIDS
Vaccine Since 2002, at http://www.iavi.org/viewpage.cfm?aid=13 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
Vaccine research has largely focused on those strains that are dominant in the North. Id. As to
vaccines, then, AIDS can also fall within the international orphan category. Id.
132. See Ringel et al., The Elasticity of Demand for Health Care, A Review of the Literature
and its Application to the Military Health System (Rand 2002). DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., RAND
INSTITUTE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE, PRELIMINARY

RESEARCH
RESULTS
14
(2001),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/publications/
DB/DB362.0/DB362.0.pdf.
133. Id. at 9. More formally, the price elasticity of demand, Ed, is defined as the magnitude
of the proportionate change in quantity demanded over the proportionate change in price. HAL
VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 265-71 (1993). Where Ed > 1, price is relatively
elastic; where Ed < 1, price is relatively inelastic. Id.
134. Demand for such services in the North is considered "generally" price inelastic because
elasticity ordinarily varies at different points along the demand curve. Id. at 267 & fig.15.4.
Thus, at the extremes of the demand curve, the price elasticity may be greater or less than the
general coefficient provided.
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care services in the United States consistently centered around 0.17.135 This means a 1 percent increase in health care prices will lead
to a 0.17 percent reduction in demand. 136 The price elasticity of
demand for prescription drugs likewise is generally inelastic in the
North. Price elasticity calculations for prescription drugs in the
United States and the United Kingdom range from -0.17 to -0.22.137
This means a 1 percent increase in price will lead to a 0.17 to 0.22
percent reduction in demand.138
There is little empirical research on the price elasticity of
demand for prescription drugs in developing countries. Most of the
research focuses on the elasticity of demand for health care in the
context of charging user fees for services. 139 Recent studies show that
demand for health care services in developing countries is in fact
elastic.140 Indeed, it seems logical and consistent with experience that
the very low per capita income and limited health insurance in
developing counties simply does not allow consumers to ignore price
differences. This is particularly true with respect to expensive drugs
that must be taken over a long period of time to extend life or increase
its quality, such as AIDS cocktail drugs.
Price elasticity is directly related to the amount of
extracompetitive profits a patent owner can obtain by virtue of owning
the patent. 4 1 If demand is inelastic, the quantity demanded by
135. Ringel et al., supra note 132, at 20.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Id.
139. See Joes Lexchin, M.D. & Paul Grootendorst, M.D., The Effects of Prescription Drug
User Fees on Drug and Health Services Use & Health Status: A Review of Evidence (analyzing
the effect of drug user fees and patient drug use, health outcomes, and the cost of physician and
hospital based services), at http://www.thecem.net/Downloads/draft.pdf (last viewed Apr. 19,
2005).
140. See, e.g., B. McPake, User Charges for Health Services in Developing Countries: A
Review of the Economic Literature, 36 SOC. SCI. MED. 1397 (1993); PAUL GERTLER & JACQUES
VAN DER GAAG, THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR MEDICAL CARE: EVIDENCE FROM Two DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1990). Some earlier studies concluded, somewhat surprisingly, that demand for
health care in developing countries is relatively inelastic. See, e.g., JOHN S. AKIN, THE DEMAND
FOR PRIMARY HEALTH SERVICES IN THE THIRD WORLD (1985); Peter S. Heller, A Model for the
Demand for Medical Health Services in PeninsularMalaysia, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 267, 281 (1982).
McPake criticizes these earlier studies as not properly accounting for quality differences in the
care demand and as drawing data from a too limited set of income ranges. McPake, supra, at
1400. Gertler found that price elasticity of demand for health care services in rural Cote d'Ivoire
was as high as 1.8 for adults and 2.3 for children. GERTLER, supra, at 86. Gertler estimated
price elasticity by reference to the opportunity cost of being away from agricultural labor in order
to obtain care. Id. at 87.
141. See Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Review and Suggested Approach for Licensing
Patent Applications, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 340, 344 (1999) ('The price elasticity of
demand for a patented product is defined by several factors, including factors related to the legal,
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consumers will remain sufficient at the monopoly price to allow the
patent owner to obtain sufficient rents. If demand is elastic, the
quantity demanded may not be sufficient at monopoly prices to
provide sufficient returns to cover the investment in research and
development. This concept can be illustrated as follows.
Assume a hypothetical market in which the manufacturer is
able to produce a medication at a cost of $30 per yearly treatment. If
the market is inelastic-for example, an elasticity of 0.2, close to the
average demand elasticities for prescription drugs in the North-the
manufacturer can charge a premium price of $6,500 per course of
treatment (the approximate cost, for example, of a yearly course of
treatment with the AIDS drugs ZERIT and VIDEX), resulting in
demand for approximately 115,000 courses of treatment. 142 In a
competitive market, where price equals marginal cost, a quantity of
335,000 courses of treatment would be demanded, given a constant
elasticity demand curve with an elasticity coefficient of 0.2, as shown
143
in the following illustration:

technical and marketing disciplines."); Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive
and Non-Competitive Conditions, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 279, 286 (2000) ("[A]
monopolist's profit maximizing price is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand for the
product. Thus with costs assumed constant, the patent profit will also be inversely related to this
elasticity. A major determinant of this price elasticity is the availability of close substitutes.")
One standard method of measuring monopoly power, the Lerner Index (L), is price minus
marginal cost divided by price, which equals the reciprocal of the price elasticity of demand (rl):
P-MC 1
P
t,
Thus, a large elasticity of demand implies a lack of monopoly power, whereas a low elasticity of
demand (in other words, inelastic demand) implies a higher index of monopoly power. KIP
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 258-59 (3d ed. 2000). Thus, elasticity
of demand is tied to a firm's ability to act as a monopolist.
142. Bristol-Myers's combination therapy of ZERIT and VIDEX currently costs
approximately $18 per day, or $6,500 per patient per year. Firms to Sell AIDS Drugs in Africa
Below Cost, Assoc. PRESS, Mar. 15, 2001, available at http://www.canoe.ca/HealthOlO3/15-aidsap.html. BMS reported annual sales of $705-755 million for these two compounds in 2001 and
2002. Bristol-Myers 2002 SEC Form 10-K, supra note 115. This would mean approximately
115,000 patients were treated each year at the price of $6,500 per year. Of course, this is only a
rough estimation of demand, but it provides a useful illustration for the purpose of this
discussion.
143. The data and calculations underlying this illustration are on file with the author.
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Figure 1 - Demand at Constant Elasticity 0.2:144
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The premium price of $6,500 allows the manufacturer to obtain
a $720 million increase in total revenue over marginal cost pricing.
The reduction in output as a result of this price increase is the area
labeled "A" in Figure 1, which represents the decline from 335,000 to
115,000 courses of treatment. This reduction in output is the price
society pays so that the patent owner can obtain the rents needed to
fund its blockbuster research and development model.
If the market is elastic, however, the same price increase
results in less than ten people being treated, with essentially no
revenue to the producer, as illustrated in the following comparison
between elastic and inelastic demand curves shown in Figure 2:

144. This figure assumes a constant elasticity of 0.2, meaning the elasticity coefficient is the
same at all points along the demand curve. See VARIAN, supra note 12, at 271-72, for a
discussion of constant elasticity demands. Ordinarily, elasticity varies at different points along
the demand curve. See id. at 267 & fig.15.4. The constant elasticity demand curve, however,
provides a useful illustration of the effects of differing degrees of price elasticity on output and
revenue.
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Figure 2 - Elasticity 2 Compared with Elasticity 0.2:145
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In fact, because revenue always declines with price increases in
an elastic market, the firm will always lose revenue if it prices the
product above marginal cost, even if the increase is less severe than a
1 46
$30 to $6,500 jump.
This example illustrates how price elasticity drives the
essential medicines problem. The inelastic market allows the firm to
obtain the kind of supercompetitive profits it needs to recoup research
and development costs with a more modest societal cost in terms of
untreated patients. Where distinct markets exist, some of which are
price inelastic and some of which are price elastic, the product will be
unavailable to most consumers in the elastic market. When the
product is an essential technology, such as an important drug, this
means that people in developing countries will be shut out by price.
The next Section will review some common approaches to this
problem.

145. This figure depicts a constant price elasticity of 2 compared with a constant price
elasticity of 0.2. See supra note 133 for a discussion of the use of a constant elasticity demand
curve in this illustration. The formula in the figure is the formula for calculating price elasticity
of demand. See supra note 133.
146. See VARtAN, supra note 9, at 268-70 for a discussion of the relationship between revenue
and price elasticity.
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COMMON APPROACHES TO THE DEMAND ELASTICITY PROBLEM

Much of the literature concerning differing market elasticities
14 7
assumes the importance of strong patent protection in all markets.
Some economists and policy experts suggest that the increased social
cost of the market imperfections caused by strong patent protection in
developing country markets should be addressed through government
or multinational subsidies, corporate altruism, or some combination of
both.
Jeffrey Sachs, for example, has proposed the creation of an
international vaccine purchase fund.1 48 The fund would be endowed
by the international community and would set purchase targets and
prices for designated vaccines, in effect creating an inelastic market
for such vaccines. 149 Mattias Ganslandt, along with Keith Maskus and
Eina Wong, have proposed a similar international fund, endowed by
Northern countries, that would purchase licenses for essential
medicines, such as AIDS drugs, and subsidize the distribution of those
medicines in developing countries. 150 The authors estimate that it
would cost $4.7 to $8.1 billion per year to subsidize AIDS treatment in
151
Sub-Saharan Africa.
The prospect of a multinational fund to subsidize the purchase
of essential medicines is compelling.
Given the high cost of
subsidizing the drug purchases for just a single condition in one
region, however, it is unlikely that purchase subsidies could become a
complete or even substantial solution to the essential medicines
problem. Moreover, the political will needed to create and sustain a
massive international purchase subsidy program likely does not exist.
It would be difficult, at the very least, to raise taxes in the United
States for such a fund in the current unilateralist climate.
Other economists have suggested that these differences in
152
demand elasticity present a compelling case for Ramsey pricing.

147. See, e.g., Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and DistributingEssential Medicines to
Poor Countries: The Defend Proposal, 24 WORLD ECON. 779, 785 (2001) (discussing patent
protection).
148. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE CASE FOR A

VACCINE PURCHASE FUND, available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/malaria/malaria.htm (last
visited Apr. 19, 2005).
149. Id.
150. Ganslandt et al., supra note 147, at 20-21; see also Keith Maskus, EnsuringAccess to
Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations,20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563 (2002) (discussing
the feasibility of the international fund).
151. Ganslandt et al., supra note 147, at 20.
152. See generally Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing for
Pharmaceuticals:Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT'L J. OF HEALTHCARE FIN. & ECON.
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Ramsey pricing is a form of differential pricing in which price is at
least equal to marginal cost in all markets, and price exceeds marginal
cost in the aggregate over all markets by enough to cover the costs of
R&D and to provide a return on capital. 153 In the international
pharmaceutical market, under Ramsey pricing, the price in markets
with elastic demand would be at or close to marginal cost, while the
price in markets with inelastic demand would exceed marginal cost by
the appropriate amount.154

Ramsey pricing may be efficient when there is inelastic
demand for a pharmaceutical product in the North. Such products are
likely to be developed in the first instance for the Northern market.
The above marginal cost pricing permitted by patent protection in the
North would allow the manufacturer to recoup its R&D expenses and
obtain a return on capital. Marginal cost pricing in the South would
make the drug available at a lower cost in the South and would not
have any negative impact on the firm's viability. 155
There are a number of problems with Ramsey pricing in the
international pharmaceutical context, however. A significant issue
often cited by Northern pharmaceutical firms is the problem of
parallel imports. Consumers in Northern countries with higher prices
may attempt to import lower cost drugs from Southern countries with
lower prices. This would upset the price structure in the Northern
countries and circumvent the intended social welfare benefit of
making the cheaper drugs available in the South.
Advocates of Ramsey pricing often cite stronger national patent
laws that bar parallel imports as a solution to the Ramsey pricing
problem. 156 However, with the increased importance of regional
trading areas, strict national import bars might not be workable. The
European Union, for example, adheres to a doctrine of international
exhaustion, which holds that patent rights in a given product
(including the right to prevent parallel imports) are exhausted upon

183 (2003) (arguing a need for economic patents and the potential for differential pricing to both
increase affordability while preserving incentives for innovation in developing countries).
153. Id. at 186
154. Id. at 184
155. Id. at 202.
156. See id. at 193:
A broad-based differential pricing structure will only be possible if higher income
countries accept the responsibility to pay higher prices, foregoing the temptation to
try to obtain lower prices granted to low income countries, and middle income
countries recognize that it may be appropriate for them to pay prices that provide a
return on R&D for at least part of their populations.
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the first sale of that product into a member country. 15 7 The United
States is currently considering a similar rule for pharmaceutical
15
products imported from Canada.
Another significant problem with Ramsey pricing in global
pharmaceutical markets is the prevalence of external reference prices.
It is common for regulators to refer to lower prices received by
consumers in other countries and to demand the same price for
consumers in their home country. This creates a disincentive for
manufacturers to offer marginal cost pricing in demand elastic
markets. Instead, the manufacturer will forgo those markets or offer
159
more uniform price bands in all markets.
Ramsey pricing advocates respond to this objection by
suggesting that Northern nations should voluntarily forgo reference
pricing or that mechanisms should be established to keep pricing
Voluntary compliance, however, depends on
decisions secret. 16 0
political will, which is uncertain and transient. Secrecy provisions
may be helpful, but such secrets will be difficult to keep; even one
disclosure could upset the entire scheme.
Moreover, Ramsey pricing would not address the international
The growth of the pharmaceutical
orphan drug problem. 16
manufacturing industry in some developing countries suggests that
drugs for international orphan conditions could be developed and
Demand for
supplied if there were a market for them.
pharmaceuticals in the North is highly elastic or non-existent for
drugs that are intended to treat tropical diseases because such
diseases generally do not affect the population in those countries. The
current patent system provides no incentive to conduct research and
development under these circumstances. Ramsey pricing will not
change this fact; there is no market in which the higher prices needed
to recoup research and development costs could be obtained.
Ramsey pricing might also entail externalities resulting from a
lack of generic competition in Southern markets. The Ramsey pricing

157. Joseph Darba and Joan Rovira, ParallelImports of Pharmaceuticalsin the European
Union, 14 PHARMACOECONOMICS SUPPL. 129, 129-36 (1998); Tait R. Swanson, Comment,
Combating Gray Market Goods in a Global Market: Comparative Analysis of Intellectual Property
Laws and Recommended Strategies, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 327, 345 (2000); Darren E. Donnelly,
Comment, ParallelTrade and InternationalHarmonization of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine,
13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 469 (1997).

158. Danzon, supra note 144, at 15.
159. See Danzon & Towse, supra note 152, at 185 (noting marginal cost pricing cannot
generate sufficient revenue to cover the R & D of firms).
160. Id. at 197-99.
161. Patricia Danzon, a differential pricing advocate, agrees that differential pricing is not a
solution for the international orphan problem. Id. at 184.
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model assumes that the price-differentiating manufacturer retains
exclusive rights to the drug but simply refrains from seeking
monopoly rents in Southern markets. If the manufacturer does not
have exclusive rights in the Southern market, the potentially smaller
market share resulting from the presence of generic entrants,
particularly where the local generic entrant is able to market and
distribute the product more efficiently, might deter the Northern
manufacturer's entry into the Southern market. 162 Strict exclusivity,
however, would force many, if not most, Southern pharmaceutical
manufacturers out of business. The resulting loss of jobs would
further damage fragile Southern economies. Perhaps even more
problematic, the loss of such firms would mean the depletion of
indigenous research and development capability, resulting in even
greater balkanization of the international orphan conditions. Ramsey
pricing, therefore, is not a complete solution to the essential medicines
problem.
Finally, other commentators have suggested adjustments to
the patent application process or to the availability of patent
remedies. Jean Lanjouw, for example, has suggested a patent system
that would require the inventor to elect patent protection in either the
Lanjouw's
United States or in a developing country market. 163
mechanism is based on the requirements in U.S. patent law that an
invention made in the U.S. first be patented in the U.S. and that a
foreign filing license be obtained before a patent is applied for in
another country.1 64 Lanjouw's proposal would require that foreign
license filings for certain types of technologies-cancer drugs, for
example-include a declaration that the applicant will not sue for
162. See KEITH E. MASKUS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7

(2001) ("The absence of product patents and the relative ease of entry into imitative production
means that there are significant numbers of ... firms producing generics .. . in countries

without product patents."), available at http://www.wipo.intlabout-ip/enlstudies/pdf/ssa-maskus
_pi.pdf.
163. Jean 0. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and International
Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 91-93 (2002). Other commentators have suggested
differences in the content or enforcement of patent measures in different markets, but without
Amir Attaran, for example, has proposed a rule of
proposing a specific mechanism.
nonjusticiability for complaints relating to allegedly infringing exports of some medicines to poor
countries. Amin Attaran, The Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and the Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals,and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &

ENT. L. J. 859, 859 (2002); see also Kelley A. Friedegen, Comment, Rethinking the Struggle
Between Health & Intellectual Property: A Proposed Framework for Dynamic, Rather than
Absolute, Patent Protection of Essential Medicines, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 689, 689-93, 736
(2002) (proposing "dynamic" patent protection that would "involve a somewhat diminished
expectation of protection or reward in exchange for an additional benefit").
164. Lanjouw, supra note 163, at 91-92.
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patent infringement in specified developing country markets that need
65
access to the technology.1
Lanjouw's mechanism is appealing in that it allows for the
benefits of generic competition in developing country markets. Its
reliance on national foreign filing certification procedures, however, is
problematic. First, the certification procedure would require changes
in the national laws of other pharmaceutical-producing countries that
do not currently have a foreign filing certification requirement.
Lanjouw recognizes this problem and suggests that it should not be a
major issue because a relatively small number of countries produce
most of the world's pharmaceutical products. 166 Nevertheless, the
procedure requires a more fundamental change than a system that
relies on the principles already established in TRIPS and the Doha
Declaration and therefore would likely be more difficult to implement.
An additional problem with Lanjouw's approach is the
possibility that manufacturers will "forum shop" for countries that are
not currently major pharmaceutical producers and therefore will not
adopt certification requirements.
Lanjouw suggests that forum
shopping will be limited because many other factors go into the choice
of research and development sites and, if research and development
becomes concentrated in additional noncertification countries, those
countries could be encouraged to adopt certification requirements. 167
It seems unlikely, however, that a country would adopt certification
requirements if the lack of such requirements is prompting the
investment from the multinational pharmaceutical industry. This
would simply create an ongoing cycle of forum shopping.
Perhaps the most significant question raised by Lanjouw's
approach is who would decide which technologies and countries to
certify. Presumably an international body such as the World Trade
Organization would make these decisions. It might be politically
untenable in many countries-the U.S. not the least among them-to
have a body such as the WTO dictate changes in national patent laws
on an ongoing basis. The Doha Declaration, in contrast to Lanjouw's
proposal, provides a means by which developing countries can exempt
themselves from certain treaty obligations without requiring any
change in the producing country's national patent laws.
Notwithstanding the problems with the mechanism, the idea
that the international patent system should respond to differences in
demand has merit. For example, where demand is inelastic in the

165. Id. at 92.
166. Id. at 110-11.
167. Id. at 111-12.
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North but highly elastic in the South, the level of patent protection in
the South may have little impact on R&D incentives. The prospect of
patent protection in the North will provide the Northern
manufacturer with sufficient incentive to conduct research and
development and an opportunity to recoup its costs. The absence of
patent protection in the South will encourage the growth of the
Southern generic industry, which will allow the drug to be offered
more cheaply in the South and will provide the spillover benefits of a
local industry.
Where demand is elastic in both the North and South, as in the
case of international orphan drugs, the relative strength of patent
laws might make little difference. A research and development based
pharmaceutical firm, for example, faces high research and
development costs and high opportunity costs when considering
whether to pursue a particular compound. If there is little prospect of
obtaining monopoly rents because of high demand elasticity, patent
protection may not provide sufficient incentive for the research and
development. The next Section tests these propositions with a game
theory analysis and proposes some possible changes to the
international patent system based on that analysis.
VI. RETHINKING THE INNOVATION GAME UNDER TRIPS

Game theory provides a particularly useful analytical
framework for the essential medicines question because it allows us to
test how the players will respond given changes in one or more of the
rules that govern the game. 168 This analysis is not, of course,
necessarily predictive or precise. However, a model can be constructed
from the information developed in Part III above to test how different
changes in the patent system might affect incentives to create new
drugs. In particular, the model examines the relationship between
levels of patent protection and demand elasticity.
The model includes two hypothetical firms that represent the
types of pharmaceutical manufacturing firms that exist in the
developed and developing world. These are the Northern country
manufacturer ("NM") and the Southern country manufacturer ("SM").

168. For a general discussion of how game theory can be used to test legal rules, see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).

As Baird et al. note, "[g]ame

theory, like all economic modeling, works by simplifying a given social situation and stepping
The spirit of the
back from the many details that are irrelevant to the problem at hand ....
enterprise is to write down the game with the fewest elements that captures the essence of the
problem." Id. at 7. For a more detailed discussion of game theory principles, see generally ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1990).
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The NM is primarily a research-based pharmaceuticals firm. It has
an existing international marketing and distribution network. The
SM primarily produces generic drugs and active pharmaceutical
ingredients ("APIs") but has budding original research and
development capability and only limited capacity to market and
distribute new drugs internationally.
A simple two-by-two game may be used to model whether a
firm will choose to innovate or imitate (i.e., copy the innovation).16 9
The payoff functions in this game represent returns on investments.
The expected payoffs for original research and development account
for the likelihood that a viable compound will be a successful drug. As
noted in Part III.A. above, original research and development that
leads to a viable therapeutic compound can provide two types of
returns: (1) a drug that produces revenues somewhat in excess of
variable costs but does not recoup all research and development costs;
or (2) a more profitable compound that produces revenues
substantially in excess of research and development costs. A generic
compound will not have such substantial research and development
costs and, therefore, will provide rents where the price can be set even
a small increment above the marginal cost. This typically would occur
at the early stages of generic entry when there are a limited number of
generic competitors in the market.
A. Payoffs in Inelastic-ElasticMarkets
As discussed in Part III.A. and B. above, markets for
pharmaceutical products generally are inelastic in the North and
elastic in the South when the product treats a condition prevalent in
the North. Based on the existing pricing and access problems relating
to AIDS medications, this appears to hold true for such medications.
Therefore, payoff functions in the "inelastic-elastic" market can be
based on the AIDS drug case study presented in Part III.C.
As described in Part III.C., the price of $6,500 per course of
treatment with AIDS cocktail drugs resulted in demand for 125,000
treatments, for total revenue of $812,500,000. If the drug has a
typical sales cycle, it will have a bell-shaped curve over a life of about
twenty years, with sales peaking in about the eighth year. 170 Total
gross revenues for the drug would then be approximately $6.5 billion.
169. RASMUSEN, supra note 168, at 294-95.

170. Joseph A. DiMasi, et al., Returns on Research and Development for 1990's New Drug
Introductions, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS SUPPL. 3, 11, 16 (2002). Based on DiMasi's statistics, we
can expect sales to increase by approximately 20 percent each year until year 10, at which time
they will plateau for several years and then decline by 20 percent each year through year 20.
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Given the assumption that the cost of producing the drug is $30 per
course of treatment, costs of production total $30 million over the
twenty years. 171 Research and development cost for a new drug is
between $450 and $800 million. A total cost of $650 million, therefore,
is a reasonable mid-range estimate of total research, development, and
production costs. This makes the NM's profits for innovation ten
times its costs for a baseline payoff of 10.172
The SM's costs for innovating are higher than the NM's. This
is because the NM has a broad and well-established research and
development program.
The NM regularly screens thousands of
potential compounds and therefore the marginal cost of screening
173
additional compounds for a particular condition is relatively low.
Moreover, the NM's large research and development capacity means
that the opportunity costs of screening additional compounds for a
particular condition is also relatively low. 1 74 In contrast, the SM may
need to add additional capacity or to divert capacity from generic
manufacturing and development efforts in order to conduct a
systematic original research and development effort. These actual
costs and opportunity costs are likely to be relatively significant to the
SM. Therefore, the SM's payoff function for original research and
development is discounted to account for these costs. The SM's
baseline payoff for innovating is thus 5.
The payoff function for "imitating" reflects the expected return
on investment of producing a generic compound for distribution in
171. This represents a demand of 125,000 at the price of $6,500 during the peak years, with
an increase and reduction in demand towards and away from the peak years, resulting in a bellshaped curve.
172. The payoff could potentially be somewhat smaller if marketing costs are included in the
calculation. Direct-to-consumer advertising spending, for example, can approach $53 million for
a heavily promoted drug such as VIAGRA.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS & MASS MEDIA

ADVERTISING 2000 2 (2001). It is unlikely, however, that the types of "essential" medicines with
which we are concerned would require the same high level of marketing and promotional
expenditures as would "lifestyle" drugs or other drugs for common conditions for which there are
numerous alternative treatments. For example, in a recent study, of the top fifty drugs in terms
of direct-to-consumer advertising spending, only a few are in categories such as antivirals or
antifungals that might fall within an "essential" medicines category. See id. Even as to those
few, direct-to-consumer spending did not exceed $41 million. Id. (listing for VALTREX).
Therefore, the baseline payoff of 10 represents a reasonable estimate even if some level of
marketing and promotional expenses are included.
173. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL

INDUSTRY PROFILE 3, 10 (2003) (noting that 5,000 compounds are screened for every compound
that is approved as a new medicine and that pharmaceutical companies spent approximately
$26.4 billion on research and development in the United States); cf. Joseph A. DiMasi, The Value
of Improving the Productivity of the Drug Development Process,20 PHARMACOECONOMICS SUPPL.
1, 4 (2002) (noting differing costs of drug development at different phases of review).
174. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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developing countries and LDCs. As noted in Part III.C., the marginal
cost of producing a year's treatment with a single NRTI is as low as
$30, and generic manufacturers have charged approximately $300 per
patient per year for AIDS drugs, or ten times costs. Thus, the generic
manufacturer's payoff from imitating is also 10.
The NM's cost of imitating is higher than the SM's. An NM
that is an imitator will incur significant opportunity costs by diverting
capacity away from its original research and development mission to
generic production. The NM may also incur reputational costs if it is
seen as a supplier of "cheap" generic compounds. 175 Moreover, the NM
will incur political costs if its generic pricing is used as reference
pricing for its patented products. The NM's payoff function for
original research and development is discounted to account for these
costs, for a baseline payoff of 5.
Finally, the payoff functions must be adjusted to reflect
different levels of patent protection. The level of patent protection in
the game can be "Strong" or "Weak." Under Strong protection, the
level of patent protection in both the developed and developing
countries is similar to that which is currently available in the United
States. Under Weak protection, either there is no available patent
protection, or LDCs or the SM can easily obtain a cheap compulsory
license that allows the SM to sell to the domestic market and to export
to LDCs.
1. Weak Patent Protection in Inelastic-Elastic Markets
The Weak level of patent protection reflects to a large extent
the current market prior to full implementation of TRIPS. Developing
countries are not required to harmonize their patent laws under
TRIPS until 2005, and many have not yet done so. 176 This level of
patent protection also represents a market in which developing
countries can readily obtain low-cost compulsory licenses for domestic
use and export to LDCs.
175. It is true, of course, that the NM could establish a subsidiary to produce generic
products, but public securities disclosure requirements will not allow the NM to "hide" behind a
subsidiary.
176. See World Trade Organization, Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS, Which
Countries are Using the General Transition Periods (discussing the general transition period to
TRIPS Agreement provisions for developing countries, least developed countries and new
members), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/tripfq-e.htm#Transition (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005); YOUANDAIDS, Cheap Indian AIDS Drugs Under a Cloud (noting that an
amendment to India's Patent Act designed to meet the TRIPS deadline has
been
tabled
by
the
Indian
Parliament
and
that
local
pharmaceutical
manufacturers
have
been
resisting
compliance),
at
http://www.youandaids.org/
Features/IndiaIPSNov2004.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
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The following bi-matrix illustrates these conditions: 177
SM
Innovate

Imitate

Innovate

7.5, 3.75

10, 10

Imitate

5, 5

NM
0, 0

Payoffs to: NM, SM

The parties' baseline payoffs are as discussed above. The
payoff where both parties imitate is 0 for each party because there is
nothing in that case to imitate. The payoff to each party if both
parties innovate is 25 percent lower than their respective payoffs for
being the sole innovator. This is because the resulting patent race
likely lowers the value of any resulting invention and eliminates some
178
of the innovator's first mover advantage.
When we examine each player's best responses to the other
player's possible moves, we can see that the SM will choose Imitate
where the NM chooses Innovate and Innovate where the NM chooses
Imitate.
The NM, however, will choose Innovate regardless of
whether the SM chooses Innovate or Imitate. The Nash equilibrium of

177. For the sake of simplicity, the models used in this Article are simultaneous move games
in which the parties have complete information. See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR
APPLIED ECONOMISTS 1 (1992) for a general discussion of this type of game. Reality, of course, is
not so clear-cut. A decision whether to conduct research and development for a given condition is
based on a complex set of economic, political, and social factors and often involves a series of
sequential moves. Moreover, although information about the potential payoffs from innovation
and about the research and development activities of competitors is available, it is seldom
complete. As discussed in Part V., however, this simplified model is a useful tool for illustrating
the potential impact of differing legal rules on a particular decision point. See supra note 168
and accompanying text.
178. A patent race can lower the value of the resulting invention in at least ways. First, both
parties can obtain patents on different aspects of the invention, effectively dividing the value of a
patent. In addition, one or both parties may decide at various points in the race to make
strategic public disclosure of information, which places such information outside the scope of any
patent that eventually may issue. See generally Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in
the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000) (discussing the incentives for strategic
disclosure for both firms that are trailing and those leading in a given patent race); Gideon
Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000) (discussing strategic publication
of research findings).
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this game therefore is Innovate, Imitate. 179 This equilibrium in fact
reflects the current realities of the market-Northern multinational
pharmaceutical companies innovate and Southern pharmaceutical
firms focus on generic substitutes.
2.

Strong Patent Protection in Inelastic-Elastic Markets

The level of patent protection in this model reflects the patent
protection that is the goal of TRIPS. In this model, there is Northernlike patent protection in all markets. Compulsory licensing may be
available to the Southern manufacturer, but it is restricted
procedurally and/or substantively.
Because the Southern market is elastic, the availability of
patent protection in that market adds little, if anything, to the
innovator's returns. The demand conditions in the Southern market
simply do not permit pricing above marginal cost. Therefore, the
innovator's payoff functions remain the same as in the Weak patent
protection model.
The Strong patent protection in the Southern market does,
however, affect the imitator's returns. The imitator is not able to
market a product during the life of the patent. At least ten to twelve
years of returns are not, therefore, available to the imitator.18 0 Thus,
returns from imitating are reduced by 50 percent from the prior
model.
The following bi-matrix illustrates these conditions:
SM
Innovate

Imitate

Innovate

7.5, 3.75

10, 5

Imitate

2.5, 5.5

0, 0

NM

Payoffs to: NM, SM

179. In simple terms, a Nash equilibrium (named after the famous Princeton economist John
Nash) exists with respect to a pair of strategies "when each player cannot do better given the
strategy the other player has adopted." GIBBONS, supra note 177, at 22.
180. Generally, a pharmaceutical product can expect ten to twelve years of market life after
regulatory approvals. H.G. Grabowski, Comment, Effective Patent Life for Pharmaceuticals,U.S.
House of Representatives Colloquium for House Staff Members (1999).
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This change in the patent rules produces no change in the
equilibrium solution to the game. The Northern manufacturer will
continue to choose Innovate and the Southern manufacturer will
continue to choose Imitate.
3. Implications of the Innovation Game in the Inelastic-Elastic
Market
The games described above illustrate that the level of patent
protection in elastic markets is unlikely to change the players'
incentives as long as a profitable inelastic market with Strong patent
protection continues to exist.1 8 ' Any argument that weakening patent
protection in developing countries or LDCs in order to facilitate access
to essential medicines will undercut incentives for new drug
innovation is misplaced. The level of patent protection in developing
countries and LDCs does not matter when there is an inelastic market
for the drug in the North.
These games, however, do not illustrate the social welfare loss
that results from Strong patent protection in the South. Under Strong
patent protection, the imitator is precluded from the market until the
patent expires. This eliminates the cheaper generic drugs from the
Southern market for ten to twelve years, causing a large and
devastating welfare loss in untreated patients. This social welfare
loss in the South further contributes to the divide between the
wealthy North and poor South. The better policy, then, would seem to
be to eliminate patent protection in elastic Southern markets for
essential technologies for which there is an inelastic market in the
North.
There are several potential criticisms of this approach. The
first is that weakening patent protection in the South will drain the
South of foreign direct investment ("FDI"). FDI might include, for
example, a drug manufacturing facility built by a Northern
manufacturer in a Southern country or a codevelopment agreement
between a Northern and Southern manufacturer. Such investments
arguably contribute to social welfare in the Southern country by
82
creating jobs and transferring knowledge and skills to workers.1
181. A similar conclusion was reached by Colleen Chien in a recent empirical study of the
effect of compulsory patent licenses, typically granted as part of antitrust settlements, on
investment in research and development. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to
Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 853, 868, 896-97 (2003).
182. Some argue, however, that excessive reliance on FDI perpetrates an atmosphere of
colonialism, whereby the Southern nation remains dependent on the Northern patron. See, e.g.,
Oddi, supra note 10, at 877 (arguing in many instances the economic chains of colonialism still
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Another welfare loss could be the persistence in Southern
nations of social norms that accept and even favor a culture of piracy.
Nations that lack strong intellectual property laws or fail to enforce
existing laws tend also to lack a culture of technological innovation.
The lack of an innovation culture further ossifies moribund economies.
A third problem is potential parallel importation. Products
purchased from generic manufacturers in Southern markets without
patent protection would be diverted to Northern markets. This would
undercut the Northern manufacturer's profits in the North, reducing
the incentives provided by patent protection in that market, and
would deprive Southern consumers of their cheap source of supply.
The first two objections are answered by the limited nature of
the exception. Patent protection would be relaxed in the Southern
market only where the technology, such as a drug, is essential to
public health and then only when there is a strong inelastic market for
the technology in the North. Otherwise, the South would continue to
be required to implement and enforce Strong patent protection under
TRIPS.
The answer to the third problem, parallel importation, is
enforcement of existing import and export rules. It would remain
unlawful for a developing country or LDC to export a lower priced
product to an inelastic developed country market with Strong patent
protection, and it would remain unlawful to import such a product into
the developed country. A simple, uniform, low cost marking system
could be developed to distinguish such products. This would differ
from the system proposed in the current Article 6 compromise, which
is ill-defined, complex, and subject to an uncertain review process in
the TRIPS council. Instead, the system would require a single mark
that all generic manufacturers would use in addition to whatever
other marks they ordinarily would use on products destined for
markets with Weak patent protection.
The game theory analysis has helped clarify the appropriate
levels of patent protection for essential technologies in InelasticElastic markets. The next Part reviews Elastic-Elastic markets, such
as the market for international "orphan" drugs.

remain by "providing import monopolies in the form of patents granted by developing countries
to many of the former colonial powers").
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B. Payoffs in Elastic-ElasticMarkets
The key difference between the Inelastic-Elastic market and
the Elastic-Elastic market is the payoff for innovation. In the ElasticElastic market, the innovator cannot reap supercompetitive profits
even with Strong patent protection in the North. Under the method
we used above for calculating payoffs, the baseline payoff for
18 3
innovating under these circumstances is less than zero.
1. Weak Patent Protection in Elastic-Elastic Markets
As in the Inelastic-Elastic games,
scenario represents the current situation,
are no patents or simple compulsory
developing countries and LDCs.
The following bi-matrix illustrates

Innovate

the Weak patent protection
or a situation in which there
licensing requirements in
these conditions:

SM
Innovate

Imitate

-2,-2

-1, 10

5, -1

0, 0

NM
Imitate
Payoffs to NM, SM
The Nash equilibrium in this game is Imitate, Imitate. In
other words, neither player will produce the drug. This is in fact what
presently occurs.
2. Strong Patent Protection in the Elastic-Elastic Market
If the game is changed to reflect the level of patent protection
that is the goal of TRIPS, the payoffs from innovation will not increase
because the market does not provide an opportunity to obtain rents.
The payoff from imitation, however, will decrease since the imitator
must wait until the patent expires to enter the market.

183. The payoff is set at -1 to represent a loss of 1 times the research and development
investment. The loss is greater if both parties innovate because of the costs of the patent race.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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The following bi-matrix illustrates these conditions:
SM
Innovate
Innovate

-2, -2

Imitate

2.5,-1

Imitate
-1, 5

NM
0, 0

Payoffs to NM, SM
The solution to this game is the same as under Weak patent
protection. Both parties will choose to do nothing.
3. Changing the Incentives in Elastic-Elastic Markets
a. Public Subsidies
As the games described above illustrate, international orphan
conditions present an intractable problem: regardless of whether
patent protection in developing countries and LDCs is "Strong" or
'Weak," there is insufficient incentive for either Northern or Southern
firms to develop treatments. Activists and Northern pharmaceutical
interests have suggested a variety of solutions to this problem. For
example, some activists advocate the creation of an international fund
for neglected diseases.18 4 One organization is attempting to establish
a research and development center for neglected diseases.1 8 5 Northern
countries and pharmaceutical firms tend to focus on voluntary
186
donation programs.
Each of these possible solutions suffers from the problems
discussed in Part V above: they rely too heavily on the vagaries of
political will and corporate philanthropic sentiment.
This is
particularly true of corporate donation programs and private nonprofit
centers that are based on nonguaranteed private initiative.
While a public subsidy might at least be more stable and
predictable if it becomes a legal obligation, even a very significant
subsidy is unlikely to change the outcome of the innovation game. A

184. Jeffery Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, THE ECONOMIST, Aug.14, 1999, at 11-12.
185. Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, About DNDi, at http://www.dndi.org/cms
/publicjhtmllinsidearticleListing.asp?CategoryId=87&ArticleId=288&TemplateId=l.
186. See e.g., MERCK, ANNUAL REPORT 2000 (discussing international donation program that
make donations to people in need), availableat http://www.anrpt2000.com/access3.htm.
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subsidy of 100 percent of research and development costs, for example,
would raise the payoff for innovation from a negative number to zero.
The payoff matrix in the Weak patent regime would then appear as
follows:
SM
Innovate

Imitate

Innovate

0, 0

0, 10

Imitate

5, 0

0, 0

NM

Payoffs to NM, SM.
The game now starts to change, but the results still are not
compelling. There is no unique Nash equilibrium to this game in pure
strategies. There are three solutions in pure strategies that are Nash
equilibrium solutions: Innovate, Imitate; Imitate, Innovate; and
Imitate, Imitate. We could seek to find a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies,1 8 7 which yields a result of the NM choosing Innovate at a
probability of 0.2 and the SM choosing Innovate at a probability of
0.1.188 Therefore, if the players are mixing strategies, more often than
not each player will choose Imitate.

187. A mixed strategy equilibrium calculates a probability distribution of a player's
strategies. GIBBONS, supra note 177, at 30-31; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 168, at 69-73
(giving a detailed discussion of mixed strategies).
188. These probabilities are calculated by taking a partial derivative and setting it to zero.
We can call the probability that the NM will Innovate p and the probability that it will Imitate p1; the probability that the SM will Innovate is q and the probability that it will Imitate is q-1.
The probability that the SM will choose Innovate can then be calculated as follows:

q[p(U) + I - p(l0)]+ (1- p)[q(O) + (1- q)(U)]
q(l

-

lOq) + (1 - p)(Oq + 0).

which may be simplified to:

Taking the partial derivative and setting it to zero yields:

aENqNM = 0 1-10q-0=010q=lq=-=
I 0.1

ap

10

The calculation for the probability that the NM will choose Innovate is as follows:

q[p(U) + 1 - p(5)] + (1 - p)[p(U) + (1 - p)(U)]
q(l - 5q) + (1- p)(Oq + 0).

which may be simplified to:

Taking the partial derivative and setting it to zero yields:
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Another way to find a likely solution is to look for a focal point.
A focal point is an equilibrium solution among multiple pure strategy
Nash equilibria that is compelling because of psychological, social or
historical factors. 8 9 In this game, it is likely that the focal point
would reflect the long-ingrained "do nothing" tradition, particularly
where resources could be invested in research and development for
conditions for which there is an inelastic Northern market. Under
either mixed strategies or a focal point analysis, then, it seems
unlikely that even a very substantial subsidy can change the game's
outcome in the Elastic-Elastic market.
b. Public Subsidies Plus Market Exclusivity
What about a subsidy program that also involves changes in
the patent system? Although there is much discussion about patents
and essential medicines for which there is demand in the North, there
is little discussion of how the patent system could be modified to
encourage innovation as to treatments for international orphan
conditions. Patents, however, are a key cog in the economic engine of
innovation, and we should expect that an effort to encourage
innovation would involve patent policy.
Precedent for such thinking exists in the United States Orphan
Drug Act. 190 Under the Orphan Drug Act, firms can receive research
grants and tax credits for the development of treatments for rare
"orphan" conditions and can also receive a seven-year market
exclusivity period for such treatments. 19 1
Industry representatives and activists generally agree that the
Orphan Drug Act has been wildly successful in the United States.
Over 200 compounds have been approved as "orphan" drugs since the
Act's inception, for the treatment of conditions ranging from Sickle
Cell Anemia to Leprosy. 192 Because of the small size of the market for

N

ap

M

:=0l-5q-0=05q=lq=-=0.2

5

189. RASMUSEN, supra note 168, at 36; BAIRD, supra note 168, at 39-40. A classic example of
a focal point is a thought experiment in which individuals were told they must meet friends in
New York City on a given day without being given a specific location. Most participants selected
Grand Central Station (at the time a culturally significant meeting place) as the most likely spot
for a meeting. Id.
190. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360 aa-ee (2004).
191. Id.
192. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA FACT SHEET (2002)

[hereinafter FDA Fact Sheet], at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/factsheets/justthefacts/lOorph.pdf;
Warren R. Ross, How Industry Learned to Love - and Profit by - the OrphanDrug Act, MEDICAL
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such treatments, prior to the Orphan Drug Act there were no
incentives for large pharmaceutical firms to pursue such treatments
193
and no resources for small firms to do so.
The basic types of incentives offered under the U.S. Orphan
Drug Act could transfer to the international orphan drug problem.
For example, firms could be provided a period of international
exclusivity for developing a treatment of an international orphan
condition. As discussed in Part II.C, however, the international
orphan problem typically is not one of global market size but one of
differing demand elasticity across markets.
"Strong" patent
protection, which is a period of exclusivity, is not in itself likely to
change the equilibrium that favors neither player innovating. Even
with a relatively large market size, the inability to charge monopoly
rents limits the value of the market exclusivity period.
Indeed, a game theory analysis confirms this intuition. With
subsidies and a period of market exclusivity equivalent to patent
protection, the matrix appears as follows:
SM
Innovate

Imitate

Innovate

0, 0

0, 5

Imitate

2.5, 0

0, 0

NM

Payoffs to NM, SM.
Once again, there are three Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
Innovate, Imitate; Imitate, Innovate; and Imitate, Imitate.
The
equilibrium in mixed strategies is somewhat different: the probability
that the NM will choose Innovate (p) is 0.4, while the probability that
the SM will choose Innovate (q) is 0.2.194 Thus, in mixed strategies,

MARKETING & MEDIA, July 1997, at http://www.cpsnet.com/reprints/1997/07/orphan.htm
visited Jan. 20, 2005).
193. FDA Fact Sheet, supra note 192, at 1.
194. The calculation forp is as follows:

q[p(0) + 1- p(2.5)]+ (1- q)[p(0) + (1- q)(0)],
q(1 - 2 .5 p) + (1- q)(0) . Taking the partial derivative,

which can be simplified to
fixing it at Zero gives:

a INM =0 l-2.5p-0=02.5q=l-2.p-

ap
The calculation for q is as follows:

2.5

-0.4

(last
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the NM and SM each will choose Innovate with a higher probability
with a market exclusivity period than they would without such
exclusivity, but the probability still remains under 50 percent.
Moreover, the market exclusivity period likely will do little to change
the focal point. Where the players have done nothing for many years,
they will continue to do nothing. Therefore, although adding a market
exclusivity period may begin to tip the scales, it will not solve the
problem.
In addition, a market exclusivity period could result in
externalities that limit the social welfare benefits of encouraging
innovation. If a party should choose Innovate, the imitator will not be
able to enter the market until the patent protection expires. This will
result in a social welfare loss if the innovator is unable or chooses not
to produce a quantity sufficient to meet demand.
Consequently, an international orphan drug act modeled on the
U.S. Act will not be enough. The question, then, is whether the
payoffs, or at least the focal point, of the Inelastic-Inelastic "Weak"
patent protection game can be changed.
c. Incentivizing the Southern Firm
It will be very difficult to make any reasonably attainable
changes that might induce a Northern manufacturer to innovate with
respect to international orphan drugs. The Northern manufacturer's
business model depends too heavily on blockbuster drugs. Moreover,
the Northern manufacturer's research and development efforts
historically have been focused on conditions for which there are
inelastic demand curves in the North. The Northern manufacturer
has developed institutional knowledge and expertise and a business
culture that naturally tends towards conditions prevalent in the
North.
The Southern manufacturer, in contrast, does not yet have
much institutional experience with a particular research and
development program. The Southern manufacturer also does not have

p[q(0) + 1 - q(5)] + (1 - q)[q(0) + (1 - q)(0)], which can be simplified to:
q(l - 5q) + (1- p)(Oq + 0). Taking the partial derivative, fixing it at Zero gives:

aEl"

agq

=0 1-5q-0=05q=1p=-= 0.2

5
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a business model focused on blockbuster drugs. Its revenues currently
derive largely from bulk formulations, APIs, and generic drugs. Yet
the Southern manufacturer will soon be required to adapt its business
model to the higher levels of patent protection required under TRIPS.
This presents an opportunity to use the TRIPS and Doha mechanisms
to create a research and development culture in the South focused on
diseases that are endemic to the developing world.
The game theory analysis presented in Part VI demonstrates
that a lack of Strong patent protection in the South will not inhibit
research and development of drugs for which there is inelastic demand
in the North. Southern manufacturers should have ready access to
compulsory licenses to produce such products for domestic use or
export to other Southern nations.
However, under TRIPS, the
Southern manufacturer must pay "adequate remuneration" for such
licenses. 195 Perhaps the concept of "adequate remuneration" can be
tied to a public benefit obligation. That is, Southern manufacturers
that obtain compulsory licenses to make generic products could be
required to devote original research and development efforts to cures
for tropical diseases.
Compulsory licenses are not unique to TRIPS. Many national
patent laws provide for compulsory licenses to remedy antitrust
violations, governmental or "crown" use, or failure to work an
invention. 196 However, the concept of "adequate remuneration" under
TRIPS is untested and undefined. 197
Textually, there are two main elements to this obligation: (1)
payment to the right holder (2) of adequate remuneration. Under this
construction, an evaluation of "the circumstances of each case" and
195. TRIPS Article 31(f) states as follows: "the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization."
196. See CARLOS CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO
PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 94 (2000) (discussing different kinds of

compulsory
licenses),
available
at
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/
publichealth/publichealth.pdf; Chien, supra note 181, at 869-73, 875-76 (discussing compulsory
licensing under U.S. antitrust law and under TRIPS); Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the
Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 43637 (discussing compulsory licensing remedies under Paris Convention, GATT, and TRIPS); Paul
Gormley, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licenses and Environmental Protection, 7 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 131, 135-36 (1993) (discussing different kinds of compulsory licenses).
197. See Dara Kripapuri, Note, Reasoned Compulsory Licensing- Applying U.S. Antitrust's
"Rule of Reason" to TRIPS' Compulsory Licensing Provision, 36 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 669, 670-71,
704 (2002) (concluding that compulsory licenses should be made available under a "rule of
reason" standard); Susan Vastano Vaughan, Note, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals
Under TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 108-09

(2001) (concluding that compulsory licenses should be made available under TRIPS without
compensation to the patent holder).
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"the economic value of the authorization" would illuminate what
This could implicate an
constitutes "adequate remuneration."
analysis akin to that undertaken in many cases under U.S. law, in
which a compulsory license may be part of an injunction to remedy
antitrust violations, contingent upon the payment by the licensor of a
reasonable royalty based on a market value calculation of the
license.198
The TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions should, however,
be construed in light of the Doha Declaration's affirmation that "the
[TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented
in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all." 199 A
compulsory license based on a market value calculation would do little
to "promote access to medicines for all" because the generic producer
would then need to raise its prices to recover those licensing costs.
The concept of adequate remuneration to the patent holder under
TRIPS cannot, therefore, implicate a market value licensing fee.
Instead, adequate remuneration could be construed to permit a
Southern manufacturer to discharge a duty that might otherwise fall
on the Northern manufacturer-in particular, the duty to develop
treatments for international orphan conditions. There are at least
three ways in which such a duty could exist: (1) as a requirement for
obtaining patent protection on a pharmaceutical product, (2) as part of
a regulatory drug approval process or, (3) as part of an international
intellectual property regime.
A developing country could change its patent law so that, in
order to obtain a patent on a compound, method, or process with a
therapeutic use, the applicant must commit to contribute to research
and development of treatments for orphan conditions endemic to the
region in which the national patent office is located. This approach,
however, would violate Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which provides that
patent protection must be available if the invention meets the basic
200
criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application.
Therefore, Article 27(1) would need to be amended to allow the
national patent law of a developing country or LDC to include such a
requirement. Even with such an amendment, the inclusion of such a
requirement in a developing country's or LDC's patent law might
deter Northern firms from entering those markets.
198. See e.g., United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 348-50 (1947) (noting that
compulsory license made available at "uniform, reasonable royalties" was an appropriate remedy
against patent misuse and that the royalty should be calculated based on past market royalties).
199. Doha Declaration, supra note 52, at para. 4.
200. TRIPS, supra note 20, at art. 27(1).

2005]

INNOVATION GAME

Alternatively, a developing country could require that any
manufacturer wishing to sell pharmaceutical products in that country
must conduct or contribute to research and development efforts
relating to local diseases. This approach would avoid any conflict with
TRIPS because it is tied to regulatory marketing approval rather than
patentability.
Once again, though, this might cause Northern
manufacturers to forgo sales in the developing country market.
The best approach might be to build an obligation into the
international patent system. 20 1
Under such an obligation, for
example, a firm that desires uniform patent protection for a
pharmaceutical product in the lucrative North American and
European markets would be required to contribute to research and
development relating to international orphan conditions.
Although it may seem unrealistic to suggest such an option,
momentum has been building for some time towards a more
integrated international patent system, as is reflected by the adoption
of TRIPS. 20 2 In fact, a fundamental premise of TRIPS is that the
international harmonization of IPRs will contribute to global social
and economic welfare. 20 3 The nature of the social bargain underlying
patent protection, then, is moving away from insular territoriality
toward a more global bargain. The suggestion that the benefit of
global patent protection will carry a burden to contribute to research
and development of international orphan technologies is consistent
with these principles.
Indeed, an obligation to undertake local orphan research and
development may already exist under international "soft" human
rights law. Although states, rather than corporations, are the actors
generally bound by international human rights treaties, "soft" law
instruments, such as internal codes of conduct and guidelines
promulgated by international standards setting bodies, may impose
201. Such an obligation might become part of the compulsory licensing system under TRIPS.
This might, however, require some modification of TRIPS' national treatment provisions.
Alternatively, the obligation might become part of a more integrated international patent system
located under a new convention.
202. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 23, at 14-15 ("[Tjhe TRIPS Agreement should replace a
patchwork system of territorial regulation (that allowed free-riders in some countries readily to
appropriate the fruits of foreign investment in technical innovation) with a global competitive
framework built around the international minimum standards of protection adopted for specified
intellectual creations.").
203. TRIPS, supra note 20, at art. 7:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.
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morally binding obligations on multinational corporations. 20 4 The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, for
example, has published "Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises"
that include an obligation to perform local research and development
work. 20 5 Likewise, the United Nations is drafting a code relating to
the obligations of transnational corporations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 20 6 The U.N.'s draft code and its related
commentary state that transnational companies should apply
intellectual property rights in a manner that promotes social welfare
20 7
and local development objectives.
Once the obligation is recognized, it is a short step to conclude
that a Southern manufacturer may assume part of the obligation as
its payment of remuneration for a compulsory license.
The
compulsory license is not intended to be free. Of course, the research
and development expenditures expected of any one manufacturer
would need to be calibrated to the expected value of the compulsory
license. In some cases, some of the research and development costs
might need to come from an international fund. 20 8 In other cases, a
consortium of manufacturers who have obtained compulsory licenses
for a class of drugs might need to work together on research and
development efforts for the tropical disease. The TRIPS council or
another international body could establish such terms when the
compulsory licenses are obtained. If a viable compound for a tropical
204. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 536-37 (2001) (discussing soft law obligations that could
provide a framework for corporate international human rights responsibilities). See generally
Lissett Ferreira, Note, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of
Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133 (2002) (describing
various soft law instruments that relate to access to HIV/AIDS drugs).
205. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES § VIII.l, at 3, 5 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
206. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporationsand Other Business Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Commission.
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Agenda
Item 4, at 1-4, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38Rev.1 (2003), available at http://www.global
policy.org/socecon/tncs/2003/08ecosocnorms.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
207. Id. § 10.
208. The size of such a fund should not need to be as large as the purchase funds proposed by
Jeffrey Sachs or Mattias Ganslandt and Ketih Maskus. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text. Those would entail multibillion dollar obligations to buy up stocks of particular medicines.
In contrast, the type of fund discussed in this Part would defray research and development costs.
Such costs are, of course, significant (see Part III.A, supra), but at $400 to $800 million per drug,
they are substantially less, for example, than the $4.7 to $8.1 billion per year proposed by
Ganslandt and Maskus for AIDS treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa. See supra note 147 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the more modest research and development fund should be easier
to establish as a practical and political matter.
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disease is developed through this process, the compound and the
research that led to its development would become publicly available.
Finally, this system could well change the payoffs sufficiently
to affect the innovation game. The Southern manufacturer's ability to
imitate in the Inelastic-Elastic market is quite valuable to the
Southern manufacturer. If that ability is tied to a requirement that
the Southern manufacturer innovate in the Elastic-Elastic market,
then the payoff to the Southern manufacturer for innovation in the
latter market will increase. Thus, assuming that basic research and
development costs are subsidized, the game might change as follows:
SM
Innovate
0,10

Innovate

Imitate
0, 5

NM
Imitate

2.5, 10

0, 0

Payoffs to NM, SM.
The SM's payoff for being the sole innovator in this game is 10
because innovating allows the SM to obtain a compulsory license in
the separate Inelastic-Elastic, Weak Patent Protection game, and the
payoff to the SM for imitating in that game is 10. The SM's payoff for
innovating is not decreased if the NM also innovates-the SM obtains
the compulsory license in the other market regardless of what the NM
does in this market.
The game has now changed.
The Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies is Imitate, Innovate. The SM will
innovate with respect to the tropical diseases.
VII. CONCLUSION

The analysis set forth above demonstrates that a rational
international patent system for essential technologies should respond
to the differences in price elasticity of demand in different national
markets.
Where demand is inelastic in developed countries, a decrease in
the level of patent protection offered in developing countries is
unlikely to have much effect on the equilibrium of the innovation
game. Northern (developed country) manufacturers are likely to
expend R&D resources in hopes of winning monopoly profits from
patent protection in the developed countries. This is true even if the
product will be subject to weak patent protection (in other words,
compulsory licenses or parallel imports) in developing countries.
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Southern (developing country) manufacturers are likely to copy rather
than innovate regardless of the level of patent protection in their
home countries. Under these circumstances, incentives for innovation
remain intact, and the developing country markets, where demand is
always highly elastic, can be supplied with cheaper generic
substitutes. Thus, broad Doha-like exceptions are efficient where
developed country demand is inelastic.
Where demand in developed countries is elastic, however, the
game changes. The developing country manufacturer is unlikely to
invest in R&D because the ability to recoup that investment through
monopoly pricing is diminished. This is true regardless of whether
patent protection in developing countries is strong or weak. The high
demand elasticity in developing country markets makes the R&D
investment too great a gamble for developed country manufacturers if
the developed country market cannot support monopoly prices.
In the case of essential medicines, the market in developing
countries is highly elastic, or very small, for vaccines and treatments
for most tropical diseases. Therefore, no matter what level of patent
protection is afforded in developing countries, it is unlikely that
developed country manufacturers will devote significant R&D
resources to such vaccines or treatments. Likewise, it is unlikely that
strong patent protection, by itself, will provide significant incentives to
developing country manufactures, which can make easier and higher
profits producing generic versions of other medicines. This suggests
that the international patent system must incorporate other
incentives to stimulate R&D in essential technologies where demand
in developed countries is highly elastic.
Such an incentive can be incorporated into the "adequate
remuneration" requirement for compulsory licenses. The Southern
manufacturer's payment for a compulsory license could be a
requirement that the Southern manufacturer invest in research and
development towards cures for tropical diseases. If such research and
development also is funded in part through an international fund, the
promise of readily available compulsory licenses for other compounds
could be enough to change the outcome of the innovation game. In
this way, we can perhaps find a better balance between innovation,
profits, and the public good.

